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MY SISTER'S KEEPER?: LAW, CHILDREN,
AND COMPELLED DONATION
MICHELE GOODWIN*

INTRODUCTION

Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not
follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of
their children before they have reached the age of full and legal
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves. 1

In thinking about this Symposium, The Politics of Health Law,
I wanted to consider the politics of organ donation, particularly
from the perspective of children. Compelled organ and tissue do
nation from children is a passively accepted norm. As such, a de
bate as to whether and under what circumstances children may
serve as medical donors is largely nonexistent. With the exception
of noted scholars such as Jennifer L. Rosato,2 John J. Paris,3 and
Michelle Oberman,4 and more recently the intersectional scholar

* Wicklander Chair and Director of the Health Law Institute, DePaul University
College of Law. I would like to thank Barbara Noah and the editors of the Western
New England Law Review for inviting me to participate in this symposium edition.
Barbara Noah is an outstanding colleague in the health law field and this symposium
provides a special opportunity to collaborate-thank you, Barbara. I am also grateful
to Professor Martha Fineman for inviting me to participate in the conference on Ge
netic Manipulation and Enhancement Technologies at Emory Law School where I
shared some of my thoughts expressed in this Essay. Many thanks to Jane Cohen, Ani
Satz, and Marie Fox for their thoughtful comments at the conference. I would also like
to thank Erin Crow, my research assistant, for her dedicated service. This Essay draws
upon my prior scholarship and borrows from the argument presented in Altruism's
Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ Commodification. See Michele Goodwin, Altruism's
Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305 (2004).
1. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
2. See Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents
Should Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73
TEMP. L. REV. 1, 57 (2000).
3. John J. Paris et aI., Has the Emphasis on Autonomy Gone Too Far? Insights
form Dostoevsky on Parental Decisionmaking in the NICU, 15 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH·
CARE ETHICS 147 (2006).
4. Michelle Oberman & Joel Frader, Dying Children and Medical Research: Ac
cess to Clinical Trials as Benefit and Burden, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 301 (2003).
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ship of Kimberly M. Mutcherson,5 which blends public policy law
with family law, too few legal scholars scrutinize the impact of these
questions. The lack of scholarship in this domain might indicate
that the whims of parents in organ retrieval from children are too
complicated and morally bound to easily unravel. Further, com
pelled tissue and organ donation is an area largely overlooked in
state and federal regulation. Thus, at a glance, the case law involv
ing the use of children in organ and tissue transplants indicate judi
cial deference and social ambivalence to parents at the risk of
devaluing the autonomy, privacy, and integrity of children.
This Essay, quite simply, is about the contemporary reach of
the Good Samaritan Rule, commonly known as the "duty to res
cue." The Essay scrutinizes whether and under what circumstances
parents' rationalization for compelling organ and tissue donation
from their children is ever proper or legitimate. In other words,
when and under what circumstances can parents impose that duty
to rescue-on their children to save the life of another. It critiques
what I refer to as "reproductive altruism," meaning creating a child
as a life-saving resource for a dying child. Reproductive altruism
happens to conflict with the most noble principles of altruism,
which theoretically, if not actually, govern federal and state guide
lines for organ and tissue donation. This term too might be inade
quate, but the aim is to speak more precisely to what is happening,
which is not direct altruism, but rather imposed, manufactured, or
compelled altruism. Sophisticated reproductive technologies afford
parents the means to create organ and tissue donors, but legislation
and jurisprudence have yet to address these modern scenarios.
Drawing from popular culture-specifically the recent best-selling
novel, My Sister's Keeper, by Jodi Picoult,6 and Kazuo Ishiguro's
Never Let Me Go 7-1 explore how judicial considerations might be
framed and what values are most essential to preserve in establish
ing a framework for compelled living donations, particularly from
children.
Ishiguro's novel is an insightful journey into a world imagined,
but unstudied, as of yet, by academics. With his languid prose, a
very sad dystopia awaits us. The irony, of course, is that his fiction
alized future represents more of a contemporary legal realism,
5. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway? An Updated Model of
Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL 1.L. & PUB. POL'y 251
(2005).
6. 10DI PICOULT, My SISTER'S KEEPER (2004).
7. KAZUO ISHIGURO, NEVER LET ME Go (2005).
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where children are produced or created specifically to serve as "do
nors" and to provide "gifts" to others. Ishiguro questions the
broader usage of preimplantation genetic diagnosis and in vitro fer
tilization through innuendo; the children here are "clones" created
in test tubes. He plays with the knowledge that "they know, but
don't know," meaning that the children simply adapt to the life
given them.S
In the novel, these children are born to either enhance medical
understanding or serve as "donors" and "carers" until they die.
The haunting tale teases the reader along because the children
apart from their macabre purpose-are quite normal; they are the
children born through advancements in biotechnology. That they
are born specifically to serve as "altruistic" organ donors minimizes
the full value of their lives-it tells only one aspect of the story
although this is Ishiguro's point. Bound people adapt and children
are resilient. The children know and understand Ishiguro's world,
where their sacrifice is socially, legally, and psychologically normal
ized. Yet, his prose pushes us into a type of complicity with the
concept of compelled donation from children because that reality is
normalized in his novel. No longer is it a question as to whether
creating individuals to save the lives of others is ever justifiable; in
Ishiguro's novel our satisfaction with, if not absolute reliance on,
the cures that come from biotechnological advancements has made
donors and carers necessities, and a responsibility that the state
willingly assumes (as the clones are effectively wards of the state).
Much as an adopted child ponders over her connection to a
biological parent, so do these children secretly seek out their "pos
sibles" (the individuals who provided their DNA and genetic mate
rial). They look for their possibles among the faces of people in
pornographic magazines, figuring only individuals among the skid
row would be desperate and destitute enough to participate in a
cloning program. Thus, Ishiguro insinuates that one possible (and
dramatically horrific) outcome associated with incentives for organs
might be that only the poor and socially disconnected will partici
pate, and such programs will necessarily violate general moral and
ethical principles.
Ishiguro's novel provides a provocative backdrop for a legal
study of compelled donation; his veiled references to slavery touch

8.

Id. at 266-68.
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upon Richard Titmuss's9 plea against incentives for blood and or
gan donation. Yet, as the author alludes, an organ shortage coupled
with overwhelming demand will necessarily lead to complicated and
often undesirable options. The proper question will be: what op
tions pose the least harm, risk, coercion, and fraud, and also pro
vide the best benefits. As Neil Komesar notes, all choices-when
law and resources are strained-are necessarily burdened. IO The
problem, however, is that societies become wedded to systems and
legislatures to laws-even bad ones-and change is regarded as an
insurmountable obstacle.
The use of children as organ suppliers is but one of the prob
lematic results of an organ procurement system that relies exclu
sively on altruism. Federal regulations prohibit any method of
compensating adults for their expenses and wages connected with
organ donation, yet ironically ignores the forced use of children as
organ and tissue donors. Not only can an adult be fined for reim
bursing another for wages missed due to organ recovery, the Na
tional Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) imposes mandatory
incarceration.1 1 Further, based on reported cases and other data, I
contend that the present altruistic organ procurement process in the
United States is likely to exacerbate expectations that children are
appropriate organ producing resources. Those worried about the
potential negative effects of introducing incentives into organ pro
curement should consider that children are far more commodified
in the present procurement system than any adult would be, whose
compensation for providing an organ might be reimbursement for
travel expenses, living expenses, and wages.
Thus, one by-product of a federal prohibition on organ sales,
and its enforcement of an altruistic procurement model, happens to
be the use of children and the creation of children to support and
sustain the living. In the United States, legislators have drowsily
acquiesced to Titmuss's altruistic based organ procurement model,
9. See, e.g., RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFr RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN
BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 242-46 (1971) (drawing the line between social good and
economic value in blood donations; ultimately arguing for altruism to dominate "gift
relationships" between donors and recipients in order to avoid devaluation of the
individual).
10. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SuP·
PLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 3-4 (2001).
11. See, e.g., 42 U.S.c. § 274(e) (2000). This section of the National Organ Trans
plantation Act (NOTA) gives rise to criminal penalties, including imprisonment, and
fines for the purchase or sale of human organs, including livers, hearts, and kidneys for
use in transplantation.
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ignoring its more serious problems; efforts to introduce alternative
plans before the President's Council on Bioethics are thoughtfully
tolerated,12 but ultimately dismissed. Altruistic organ procurement
has benefited many over the years, but disserves thousands each
year, because too few organs are available and thousands of people
die annually because organs are not available. 13 Ishiguro paints a
world about choice; as he informs the reader, desperate people will
turn to children if organs are not available.
I was moved to consider Jodi Picoult's work because it has cap
tured the public's attention, and more importantly, the author de
tails in fine precision the medical and legal complications
experienced by the daughters caught in an internecine divide, giving
fiction the most compelling "real life" narrative. Picoult's novel
caught my attention for another reason: my Torts students were
reading it. Thus, the novel provided a unique opportunity for aca
demic dialogue about legal concepts which my students were eager
to wrestle with and pick apart.
Moreover, Picoult's novel had great relevance for my own re
search. For example, how should courts respond to compelled liv
ing donations from children and to reproductive altruism? How do
we balance the desire to preserve life versus the desire to protect
life from unnecessary harm and interference or intrusion? This Es
say takes up the scrutiny of these issues, using a law-and-status
framework.
In early 2006, over 95,000 Americans waited anxiously for or
gans. 14 However, between January and November 2006 fewer than
12. The President's Council on Bioethics met five times during 2006, inviting
comments from a number of scholars. The President's Council on Bioethics, Meetings,
http://www.bioethics.gov/meetings (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). Among those presenting
testimony to the Council were Dr. Benjamin Hippen and Richard Epstein. Benjamin
E. Hippen, Transplant Nephrologist, Metrolina Nephrology Assocs., Charlotte, N.C.,
Testimony before the President's Council on Bioethics, Session 4: Organ Transplanta
tion and Procurement-Policy Proposals (June 22, 2006) (transcript available at http://
www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/june06/session4.html); Richard Epstein, Dir. of the Law
& Econ. Program, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Testimony before the President's Council on
Bioethics, Session 2: Organ Transplantation and Procurement-Policy Proposals (Apr.
20, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/april06/session2.
html).
13. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK AND THE SCI
ENTIFIC REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS: TRANSPLANT DATA 1995-2004, at I-I
(2005).
14. United Network for Organ Sharing, U.S. Transplantation Data, http://www.
unos.orgldata/default.asp?displayType=usData (data as of 3:41 p.m. on February 16,
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14,000 donors supplied organs.1 5 Thousands will die annually
before an organ becomes available, and more patients will be shed
from the waiting list as the United Network for Organ Sharing
(UNOS) deems them unsuitable because of age, the severity of ill
ness, or too many years on dialysis. By 2010, according to Dr. Ben
jamin Hippen, a leading nephrologist and researcher on organ
procurement options, the average waiting time for an organ will be
approximately nine to ten years. 16 To be sure, when forced to en
dure such waits the likelihood of survival is dramatically reduced.
The considerable demands for organs and bone marrow are evi
denced by our national transplant waiting lists. Yet, federal policy
makers are slow to respond to the ever-growing demand for organs
and the woefully inadequate supply to meet those needs. In the
absence of an adequate legislative response to fuel a greater supply,
individuals are creating their own supply systems, either by partici
pating in organ tourism (obtaining organs abroad from poor people
in third world countries) or by using their children to supply organs
and bone marrow. From the perspectives of dying patients in need
of organs, the options are limited and the choices are constrained
by restrictive legislation that limits all procurement to the altruistic
acquisition of organs.
Nevertheless, the question remains whether children, and even
those created for the purpose of donating, are the best solution to
our organ and tissue transplantation problems. In this Essay, I take
the position that children and the mentally ill are not viable
replacements for an incompetent, ineffective organ procurement
system. Their involvement is symptomatic of the deeply embedded
procurement strains on altruism as articulated in earlier works.17
Specifically, third-party-imposed obligations to rescue defy the
American common law tradition, but in contravention of that estab
lished doctrine can be found numerous cases involving children
supplying blood, bone marrow, skin, and organs for family mem
bers. The choices to be made are surely difficult; instinctually, most
2007). However, this sum of total patients awaiting transplant is less than the total
number waiting for specific organs. Id.
15. Id. This is the most recent data available.
16. Hippen, Testimony before the President's Council on Bioethics, supra note
12.
17. MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY
PARTS (2006); Michele Goodwin, Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law: Organ Tak
ing, Racial Profiling & Distributive Justice, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH 2 (2001), reprinted as
Rethinking Legislative Consent Law, in 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 257 (2002).
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parents desire to protect their children at all costs and in many con
texts, the law imposes this duty on them.
In their provocative books, Ishiguro and Picoult revive rescue
doctrine questions. That the books are novels, rather than treatises
on reproductive technology or family law, does not detract from
their value as compelling and disturbing studies for lawyers, judges,
policy-makers, and physicians. Picoult packs the book with an emo
tional force too often divorced from the deeply edited and arguably
sanitized cases students study, and contextualizes her examination
of compelled donation without indulging in sentimentality or stray
ing from the pertinent legal questions of substituted judgment, best
interest standards, and conflicts of interests. The foci of her book
the Fitzgerald family and the parents' legal battle with their thir
teen-year-old daughter, whom they created to save an older sib
ling-deeply scrutinizes these legal questions. Interestingly, the
legal question is not whether the Fitzgeralds may use their daughter
as a donor, but whether and how the daughter can legally extricate
her medical decision-making from them. Picoult's conclusion is
complicated; the donor child, Anna, is granted medical emancipa
tion, but nevertheless becomes the organ donor for her seventeen
year-old sibling, Kate, after a fatal car accident.
Picoult, like other authors writing about organ donation,
frames organ and tissue transactions as a "gifting," as if the donor
child is consenting to the tissue and organ harvesting. Ishiguro
treats this in a different manner, using "donor" as a life status
almost as a rite of passage-a noble stage. This language pervades
the donor-donee relationship. However, the "gift of life" is a fal
lacy according to Laura Siminoff and Kata Chillag, and perhaps
they are right,18 Organ gifting, according to the authors' study on
donor perceptions, is more like creating fettered "creditor-debtor"
relationships with the inability of donors or recipients, particularly
children, to ever fully come to closure with the transactions. 19 Their
study confirms prior research, which reveals that transplant recipi
ents may later feel unworthy or guilty about receiving the organs. 20
18. See Laura A. Siminoff & Kata Chillag, The Fallacy of the "Gift of Life," 29
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 34 (1999) ("Education campaigns identifying organ donation as
the gift of life were designed to make the public aware of the good that comes from
transplantation and to encourage people to become donors.").
19. Id. at 36 (quoting RENEE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS: OR.
GAN REPLACEMENT IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 40 (1992».
20. Philip Cohen, Donors' Dread: Why Do Children Who Help a Sick Sibling End
Up Depressed?, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 23, 1997, at 20; Deane L. Wolcott et ai., Psycho
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The donors too, according to a research study conducted by psy
chologists at the University of California San Francisco and the Pa
cific Graduate School of Psychology, experience significant angst.
Wendy Packman and Mary Crittenden, the lead authors of that
study, assert that siblings "who make up three-quarters of the do
nors in pediatric bone marrow transplant cases often suffer anxiety
and seem to feel worse about themselves than non-donor sib
lings."21 Given such compelling research findings, is it ever permis
sible to subject incompetent persons to bone marrow or organ
harvesting?
Picoult eloquently illuminates these conundrums, but leaves
readers to untangle the issues on their own. There are shortcom
ings to this approach. If her strength is raising the legal questions,
Picoult's weakness is the failure to challenge her audience with an
swers, including a failure to truly engage the reader with the juris
prudence. The author, however, succeeds intelligently in other
areas, including constructing a nuanced battle of ethics between the
donor and her parents. Yet, at the book's conclusion, Picoult's
opinion as to whether parents are the best decision makers in these
instances and whether courts should grant parents exclusive author
ity to make compelled-donation decisions remain a mystery. Her
failure to shed light on these questions is frustrating in light of her
research. 22 The author, it seems, has difficulty answering the very
question she doggedly pursues: Is harming one child to save the life
of another ever a legitimate choice? The strength of her work, as
well as Ishiguro's, then, is that they provide a framework from
which to launch lengthy thought experiments into a true legal case
study, which this Essay provides.
This Essay disentangles the jurisprudence of compelled dona
tion to evaluate the legitimacy of the rescue doctrine as applied to
children. It analyzes the questions left unanswered by Picoult and
provides context for the disturbing jurisprudence which ultimately
logical Adjustment ofAdult Bone Marrow Transplant Donors Whose Recipient Survives,
41 TRANSPLANTATION 484, 484 (1986) [hereinafter BMT Donors].
21. See Corinna Kaarlela, Press Release, Univ. of Cal. San Francisco, After Child
Donates Bone Marrow to a Sibling, Self-Esteem Often Fares Worse than that of Non
Donor Brothers and Sisters, Aug. 8, 1997, available at http://www.ucsf.edu/-adcomf
listserv/ucsfnews/0142.html.
22. Interestingly, Picoult dedicates the book to the Currans; it is unknown by this
author whether the Currans to whom she refers are those who were locked in a legal
battle in Illinois in 1990 with their father regarding the use of their bone marrow to save
the life of their older sibling. PICOULT, supra note 6; see Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d
1319 (Ill. 1990).
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grants parental authority to compel organ and tissue donations
from children. This Essay argues against that jurisprudence, sug
gesting that it is symptomatic of biotechnology outpacing the law;
children rightfully lack the legal capacity to make informed deci
sions about organ donation and their participation in transplant re
gimes should be limited to the narrowest set of circumstances.
This Essay begins with a discussion of preimplantation genetic
diagnosis and a slightly technical overview of bone marrow trans
plantation, thereby examining both the means and mode of rescu
ing siblings. It frames the discussion in two distinct ways, laying out
the legal theory for rescue doctrine and arguing that the theory be
hind the No Duty Rule had great relevance in our nascent biotech
nology era, and even more importance now. Part I briefly describes
the medical justifications for using siblings as subjects in non-thera
peutic medical cases. It then turns from the medical framework to
explore the forceful justifications of the "no-duty-to-rescue" doc
trine. Part II considers the murkier issue of language. It argues
that the "gift of life" concept is a fallacy and that compelled altru
ism contradicts the "no-duty" common law tradition. Part III un
packs the legacy of eugenics and its nefarious connection to
contemporary jurisprudence on affirmative rescue duties. I argue
that the forced use of mentally incompetent persons' body parts
greased the slippery slope of compelled organ donation, thereby
creating a legal precedent which we now struggle against. This Es
say concludes by articulating an alternative vision for organ pro
curement that might reduce parental willingness to harvest from
their children.
I.

BODY PART SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Picoult and Ishiguro cleverly demonstrate that what fits neatly
within a medical paradigm as necessary or essential treatment may
not always translate as the appropriate, moral, or legally justifiable
course of action for children. Recent national debates about the
denial of federal government funding for stem cell research, and
whether stem cells should be used in medical research and thera
pies, capture part of the social tension. The more contemporary
debates about the use of uninformed, non-consenting, or marginally
consenting participants in non-therapeutic medical treatments re
main entrapped in a moral shroud, rarely treated as a constitutional
law thought experiment, and seldom tested against legal theories in
tort law. Yet, the forced use of children in bone marrow and organ
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transplants presents a compelling case from which to explore the
moral and legal limits of biotechnology. Section A provides an
overview of Picoult's book to situate the context for this Essay.
Section B briefly identifies the ways in which contemporary bio
technologies have assisted parents in saving the lives of their dying
children, and describes the medical justifications for using siblings
as subjects in non-therapeutic medical cases. Section C turns from
the medical framework to explore the forceful justifications of the
no duty to rescue doctrine.
A.

The Problem

Jodi Picoult introduces us to a middle class family struggling
with three very different children; a disillusioned teenage son who
is consumed with anger and bitterness because his parents have
spent the last thirteen years ignoring him-or paying far more at
tention to his ailing younger sister, Kate. Anna, the donor child, is
at the center of the family's crisis; she is the youngest. Conceived
specifically for the purpose of being a donor, and having served in
that capacity her entire life, Anna is ready to stop. However, with
drawing her consent to donate blood, bone marrow, and other tis
sues is not so easy. Nor is it a clear case whether providing or
withdrawing consent is Anna's decision to make.
The story unravels as Anna seeks help from a local lawyer con
sumed by his own physical and psychological issues. The novel is
highly descriptive, predictable and somewhat pedestrian, but serves
well as a provocative thought experiment. Picoult takes great care
to sensitize readers about Anna's life. Anna's parents are reluctant
to let her join summer camps, lest she be unreachable for an emer
gency transfusion that Kate might require. Anna misses days at
school as often as her ailing sister because she too becomes a pa
tient. Anna is essentially Kate's pharmacy.
Picoult convinces the readers that Anna's social life and the
ability to develop friendships and relationships outside of her fam
ily have significantly suffered. More importantly, Picoult hints at
what a donor child's relationship with her parents might resemble.
The mother is oblivious, portrayed as one whose mission is saving
Kate to the detriment of a meaningful relationship with her other
children. The mother's ambition is to keep Kate alive at all costs.
If creating a child through in vitro fertilization and specially select
ing embryos through preimplantation genetic diagnosis specifically
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to harvest body parts is extreme, then all actions subsequent to
those departures are far less morally complicated.
Anna is symbolic-an actual and figurative tool. In this way,
Anna is also a distraction from the inevitability of Kate's death.
The parents can forestall Kate's death and avoid the pain of mourn
ing a child's loss by demanding resources from Anna. Perhaps re
quiring so much of Anna is an easier pain to cope with than the
death of a child they loved and knew before Anna's birth. But for
Anna's body parts, Kate would be dead. The complications of this
story, both moral and legal, have less to do with Picoult crafting a
novel tale. Rather, the power in this case study has more to do with
what the author does not express, but that with which we are all
familiar. The unspoken relationships and responsibilities of parents
to their children and notions of unconditional love pervade the
compelled donation dynamic. Inherently, we believe that parents
should not love one child more than another or place one child at
great risk to benefit another. But that is exactly the dynamic at
work in compelled donation cases.
B.

The Cure?

In the absence of federal protocols, regulations, or monitoring,
and with the aid of physicians, parents can create embryos in labo
ratories specifically for the purpose of harvesting organs and bone
marrow. Users of in vitro fertilization (IVF) and preimplantation
genetic diagnosis (PGD) can deselect embryos carrying genetic
"deficits" or select the "fittest" or most suitable for later harvesting.
Some critics decry such reproductive technological advancements,
referring to them as a new form of eugenics and special race breed
ing. Yet even the PGD critics avoid the ethical and legal questions
posed by the use of children to address body part supply and de
mand, which are questions far more worthy of scrutiny, in my opin
ion, than concerns about aesthetic preferences.
Indeed, those wanting for children can, without the use of
PGD, express aesthetic and financial preferences through the part
ners with whom they choose to procreate. The concerns about in
vading a child's privacy and committing tortious types of injuries to
fulfill a parent's desire seem a different category of circumstances
altogether. Indeed, only the legally subordinate status of children
renders their decision-making subject to the whims of others.
Stated differently and perhaps more accurately, because minor chil
dren lack the legal capacity to make binding legal decisions, they
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are at the mercy of adults, particularly their parents (and doctors),
to serve as responsible proxies.
Federal oversight is virtually nonexistent in the realm of repro
ductive technologies. Thus, parents are able to pick and choose
"the right" embryos for implantation and later harvesting. It
should come as no surprise, then, that some of the more stinging
critiques of PGD include criticisms that the resultant embryos are
functionally more like clones; that PGD commoditizes children;
that the technology is a eugenics tool and may exacerbate racial
divides in the broader society; that PGD is social reengineering; and
that the resulting infants are scientific guinea pigs. These criticisms
are harsh in light of the fact that most parents who use biotechnol
ogy for reproduction purposes are infertile and simply want to have
babies. To conflate their efforts with those described by the novels
discussed in this Essay would be a mistake. The darker side, how
ever, exposes the weaknesses in PGD and artificial reproductive
technology (ART) regulation when biotechnology and the demand
for body parts combine.
When is it reasonable to ask a child to donate her kidney or
lung to save a sibling? Is it ever reasonable to impose a rescue duty
on a child? Fifty years ago, these questions had only philosophical
relevance, with few practical consequences. Children and relatives
simply died from terminal illnesses that could be treated by organ
replacements; children were not needed as spare parts. Nor was
technology available to facilitate the broad scale use of children as
organ and tissue donors. As a society, we prepared for death, not
organ transplant waitlists, bone marrow registries, or in vitro fertili
zation, specifically for the purpose of creating a donor child.
Tort rules governing third-party-imposed rescue obligations on
children were simply moot, highly theoretical suppositions. First,
transplantation itself was risky, expensive, and ineffective; the odds
of survival were dramatically low in the absence of immunological
rejection medications. Second, reproductive technology was a nas
cent technology, yet to fully develop into a vibrant, meaningful tool
to unlock alternative procreative processes for designing life. Thus,
beyond the value of a provocative thought experiment, children
were shielded from any serious or meaningful consideration as res
cuers of dying siblings or relatives.
However, biotechnology now affords cures for terminal ill
nesses heretofore only imagined. For example, leukemia causes
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more deaths in children than any other disease. 23 It is also the most
commonly treated disease with bone marrow transplants (BMTs).24
In severe cases of leukemia, not only will the autoimmune system of
the child deteriorate, but an organ transplant might also be recom
mended. Doctors and parents traditionally seek the involvement of
siblings to aid their dying brothers or sisters. Such decision-making
may be medically sound, but morally and legally complicated by
concerns for the individual autonomy, privacy, and bodily integrity
of the "well" child. Twenty years ago, approximately 450 BMTs
were performed on children annually.25 By 1997, the number had
more than quadrupled to over 2,000 BMTs per year. 26 The steep
increase can be attributed to greater access to the technology and
more insurance companies providing coverage for BMT. Moreo
ver, researchers discovered that BMT could treat more illnesses
than previously considered. There are over fifty genetically inher
ited blood disorders that may lead to deficiency in the blood, im
mune, or metabolic systems in a child. For these diseases, and
especially leukemia, bone marrow transplantation is the best known
curative available to the patients. Yet, despite its relative efficacy,
the technology is not without significant complications and draw
backs for the donor and the recipient. Frequently, these drawbacks
are described from the perspective of the patient needing the trans
plant, thereby overlooking the common burdens equally exper
ienced by the child who surrenders her bone marrow.
Significantly high dosages of chemotherapy and radiotherapy
remain the preferred treatment to suppress the child's immune sys
tem in order to prevent bone marrow rejection. The graft will fail if
the injected bone marrow cells are rejected by the recipientP In
the alternative, the graft might attempt to destroy the donee's im
23. Richard Klausner, Dir., Nat'l Cancer Inst., NIH, Leukemia, Lymphoma, and
Multiple Myeloma: Toward a New Understanding, Statement Before the Senate Ap
propriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Re
lated Agencies (June 21, 2001) (transcript available at http://www3.cancer.gov/legis/
testimony/llm.html).
24. Nat'! Kidney Found., 25 Facts about Organ Donation and Transplantation,
http://www.kidney.orglnews/newsroomlfsitem.cfm?id=30 (last visited Feb. 14,2007); see
Nat'! Cancer Inst., Bone Marrow Transplantation and Peripheral Blood Stem Cell
Transplantation: Questions and Answers, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheetl
Therapylbone-marrow-transplant (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
25. BMT Donors, supra note 20, at 484.
26. Kaarlela, supra note 21.
27. Protein Level Predicts Who Will Develop Deadly Complication After Bone
Marrow Transplant, LAB Bus. WK., Mar. 19, 2006, at 294 (discussing the results of a
study done by the University of Michigan Comprehensive Cancer Center).

370

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:357

mune system, causing a severe medical emergency know as graft
versus host disease (GVHD).28 Approximately 50 percent of all pa
tients who receive bone marrow transplants will develop GVHD.29
If it occurs within the first one hundred days after the transplant,
dermatitis, enteritis, and hepatitis are well known side effects. Con
ditions associated with GVHD occurring more than one hundred
days after the transplant can result in an autoimmune syndrome
that destroys organs. Chemotherapy can reduce the likelihood of
such occurrences, or treat these conditions as they arise. Yet, chem
otherapy and radiotherapy can be problematic, as these treatments
are known to cause organ damage both in the short and long term.
Infections are common side effects of BMT procedures. The infec
tions may be difficult to treat given the preexisting vulnerable
health care status of the patient.
To reduce the likelihood of complications, doctors emphasize
the importance of close donor matches. 30 Some critics assert that
this is an over-reliance in light of alternative medical therapies. In
reality, close donor matches, particularly from siblings, are conve
nient; sibling donations reduce costs and other burdens for the do
nee, parents, and physicians. Siblings are easily accessible,
available, and need not be tracked down. Their reluctance to do
nate is easily overcome and likely given less meaningful considera
tion when balanced against the prospect of a sibling dying from a
potentially treatable illness. Thus, the power dynamic is also differ
ent; there is no negotiation process for the child who surrenders her
bone marrow or organ.
Consider a recent case reported in a Midwestern newspaper in
March 2006, involving an Oklahoma family who intended to use
their five-year-old daughter to supply bone marrow for a sibling to
be born later that year. 31 In this particular case, the Freemans
knew that with each child they bear, the possibility of the fetus in
heriting a terminal genetic disease is likely. Yet, this knowledge has
not dissuaded the Freemans from procreating because the parents
have a built-in donor supply system. According to the reporter,
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Note, however, that some physicians and researchers reject the notion that
exact matching should be the only prescribed course of research to address BMT re
lated treatment protocols. See Use Of Alternative Donor Transplants In Children With
Early Ph+ ALL Encouraged, LAB Bus. WK., Mar. 12,2006, at 63 (discussing a study
done by the Children's Hospital of Wisconsin).
31. Kristina Dudley, Family Ready to Battle Immunodeficiency Again, TULSA
WORLD (Okla.), Mar. 8,2006, at 3, available at 2006 WLNR 11016009 (Westlaw).
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"[t]he Freemans [were] hoping for a smoother medical ride with
their fourth child .... However, the chances of his immune system
growing stronger and faster appeared better because of his ... big
sister, Brittany."32 Brittany's parents were preemptive, and their
soon-to-be-born son's physicians were not only zealous in their ef
fort to promote his health, but also complicit in the compelled do
nation plan. Most enlightening about the article is Mrs. Freeman's
observation about Brittany's reluctance to be a bone marrow do
nor. Mr. Freeman expressed relief that his daughter, Brittany, was
a match, "'but at the same time, she's only 5 years old. I definitely
wish there was another way. It's a bittersweet situation.' "33 Most
telling, however, is that when Brittany" 'asked if she could wait a
few years before she had to take part in a transplant,''' the Free
mans refused. 34 Mrs. Freeman recalls, "'We said that's not possible.
Now she's glad she can help."'35
Avoiding transplant waitlists lessens the stress and psychologi
cal burdens for all parties involved, except the compelled donor
children. Donor siblings as described by Picoult are readily avail
able for probing, testing, and supplying supplemental doses of
blood, lymphocytes, granulocytes, and bone marrow. 36 Yet donor
children experience a host of potential setbacks as well. The opera
tions require general anesthesia, which although routinely used in
serious medical surgeries, nonetheless carries significant risks, in
cluding death. According to the National Marrow Donor Program,
more common problems include fatigue, faintness, headaches, sore
ness, inability to properly walk, difficulty climbing stairs, pain at the
intravenous spot, sore throat, pain sitting, pain at the collection site,
nausea, and vomitingY Donor children's health statuses as the
non-diseased or non-ill children may work against them in unique
ways. They live in the shadows of siblings with serious, life-threat
ening medical conditions. 38 Donors are far less sympathetic pa
tients when compared to their dying siblings. In fact, they are
commonly overlooked as patients, never fully making the social and
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting Jeremy Freeman).
34. Id. (quoting Emily Freeman).
35. Id. (quoting Emily Freeman).
36. PICOULT, supra note 6, at 295, 333-35.
37. See Nat'l Marrow Donor Program, Donor Information, Marrow Donation
advanced, http://www.marrow.org/DONORImarrow_donation_advanced.html(last vis
ited Feb. 14, 2007).
38. PICOULT, supra note 6, at 269.
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psychological transition from healthy children to non-therapeutic
patients. 39

C.

Rescue Doctrine's Readability and Applicability in
Contemporary Contexts

In applying rescue doctrine, a rule found in tort law, to my
reading of Picoult's book, I attempt to unearth concepts central to
American jurisprudence. The No Duty Rule, also referred to as the
Duty to Rescue Rule, derives specifically from negligence theory
and "fault" principles. American jurisprudence imposes no duty or
obligation on an individual to rescue another in the absence of hav
ing created the peril. One might interpret this as a negative rule
do no harm and there is no liability, but should you cause harm, the
law will obligate you to render assistance. There are forceful ratio
nales for the rule.
The traditional rationale against imposing liability on the inno
cent bystander for failure to act in response to another's negligence
was that it violated our notion of fairness. In other words, holding
Sunbather responsible for failing to rescue Swimmer when she did
not create the peril imposes an unfair legal duty and unreasonable
economic sanction. 40 The rationale here is that if one does not
cause the accident, she should not be at fault for failing to prevent
the subsequent injury. Combined with early contributory fault
principles, which precluded recovery if the plaintiff contributed to
her accident, the No Duty Rule fit squarely within that jurispru
dence. Another problem is that imposing an affirmative duty on
Sunbather might create a disincentive for Swimmer to exercise care
and caution. From a practical standpoint, it is difficult to know
whether, if the hypothetical Sunbather rendered aid, she and Swim
mer would survive. It is possible that she might harm Swimmer in
the process of rendering aid or that they both could die.
Nonetheless, ethicists are generally uneasy with the No Duty
Rule. Failing to save the life of another when the expertise is read
ily available seems cold, callous, and uncivilized, exposing the fault
lines in our collective humanity. A more utilitarian ethic might of
fer that life-saving resources belong to the broader community.
Such ethics are grounded in Rousseau's social contract philoso
phy-an ethic that responds to notions of an individualized social
39. Id. at 301-05.
40. See Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (refusing to impose liability
on defendant for failure to render aid in a drowning death).
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contract, whereby, even in our private dealings, we can expect, an
ticipate, or demand service from others. 41 Yet, such noble princi
ples also conflict with individual autonomy, and as Rousseau
predicted could be abused by governments. 42 Perhaps for this rea
son a duty to rescue is not reinforced through negligence jurispru
dence in the United States. 43
Consider the case of Yania v. Bigan, a well-trodden torts case
reinforcing the No Duty Rule. 44 Here, the defendant was engaged
in a coal strip-mining operation whereby trenches were dug in order
to remove coal deposits. One trench contained several feet of
water, and the defendant placed a pump in the trench to remove
the water. According to the record, the defendant taunted the
plaintiff, Yania, urging him to jump into the water, upon which he
did and drowned. The subsequent lawsuit initiated by the widow
claimed that the defendant, Bigan, caused the accident by virtue of
the incessant taunting, failing to warn, and failing to rescue. The
court rejected the plaintiff's claim, emphasizing that the complaint
did not allege that Yania had been pushed, slipped, or otherwise
received a "physical" impact from Bigan. The choice, according to
the Court, clearly rested with Yania, an adult, to decide whether he
would jump into the water. 45
Critics of the Yania decision argue that it divorces the law from
morality, thereby creating a tenuous, slippery slope. On the other
hand, imposing an affirmative duty on active or passive bystanders
might discourage otherwise socially healthy and normative behav
iors associated with common activities, or give license to zealots to
interfere in delicate situations where experienced professionals are
better suited for rescues, and where amateur rescuers pose more
harm than good. Parents might avoid playgrounds lest they become
41. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACf OR PRINCIPLES OF POLIT
ICAL RIGHT (1762), reprinted in ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACf 46-54 (Roger D. Masters
ed., Judith R. Masters trans., St. Martin's Press 1978).
42. [d. at 78-81.
43. [d. at 47.
44. Yania, 155 A.2d 343.
45. [d. at 346. One aspect of the Yania case for which modern courts might be
more sympathetic resides in the cajolery and taunting by the defendant, challenging
Yania to jump into the water. The Yania court alludes to a potentially different out
come were the plaintiff a child or person of compromised mental capacity. [d. at 345. I
think that instinct is correct. In any case, one can begin to see the range of fault and
liability in the "no duty" cases. At one end of the spectrum are perhaps the "bad sa
maritan" cases where one stands idly by while a crime occurs. Clearly, then, at the
other end of the spectrum are the cases where sibling children have no duty to surren
der body parts to save or enhance the life of a sick relative.
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liable for failing to prevent another child's accident; sunbathing and
beach sports might be avoided lest individuals be sued for failing to
predict and intervene in swimming accidents. Equally problematic
are the issues involving privacy where the lines to rescue may be
obscured at least enough to exonerate inappropriate rescue behav
ior. In such contexts, it is not hard to imagine scenarios that hide
abuse such as a male security guard's claim: "I heard a scream in
the girl's restroom; I knew that I should render aid"; and vigilante
groups policing subways, borders, buses, and neighborhoods. In
deed, problem chasing could evolve; imagine situations where indi
viduals demand to rescue or refuse to yield to more qualified
specialists. 46
Finally, bystander duties are difficult to police. If a group of
women passively attended to their children on the playground at a
time when one child became injured, should all the women be le
gally responsible for the accident, or only the woman who pos
sessed the keenest mother-wit and predicted the injured child's fall
from the monkey bars? Or are the mothers (or an individual) liable
only to the extent that they fail to respond effectively after the acci
46. Vigilantism in various forms is on the rise in the United States. See, e.g., Ken
neth van Wyk, The Rise of Patch Vigilantism (Oct. 2, 2006), http://www.esecurityplanet.
com!views/article.php/3635431; Posting of Kaimi Wenger to PrawfsBlawg, http://
prawfsblawg.blogs.com!prawfsblawg/2005/06/internecvigila.html (June 30, 2006, 6:30
p.m.). Particularly as related to immigration and the policing of state borders, vigilan
tism is a growing concern. Lynn Franey, Coalition Answers Immigration Foes: Group
Members Say Movements Such as the Minuteman Corps Are Rooted in Racism, KAN.
CITY STAR, Jan. 31, 2007, at B4, available at 2007 WLNR 1850063 (Westlaw); Editorial,
Taking Away Border Group Rights Wrong, THE SUN (Yuma, Ariz.), Jan. 24, 2007, avail
able at 2007 WLNR 1388218 (Westlaw); Megan Feldman, The Hunted, DALLAS DB.
SERVER, Dec. 14, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 22105678 (Westlaw); Carolyn
Szczepanski, To the Rescue, KAN. CITY PITCH WKLY., Nov. 16,2006, available at 2006
WLNR 20309619 (Westlaw); James Heggen, Web Site Makes it Possible for Citizens to
Guard Border from Home, UNIV. WIRE (Ames, Iowa), Nov. 10, 2006, available at 11/10/
06 UNIWIRE 22:39:32 (Westlaw). Proponents of this type of self-help view the efforts
of individuals to "protect" the U.S. border from illegal immigration as a noble and
charitable act. Some of this has strong community approval; other aspects show how
incredibly dangerous allowing individuals to take justice into their own hands can be
come. See, e.g., John Cote, Murder Case Has Grim Twist, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauder
dale, Fla.), Feb. 28,2006, at lA, available at 2006 WLNR 7341299 (Westlaw) (reporting
the murder of a young man by the victim of a robbery); Dianne Williamson, A "Savior"
Beyond Sanity?: Law, Lunacy Take Stand with Druce, SUNDAY TELEGRAM (Worcester,
Mass.), Jan. 15,2006, at B1, available at LEXIS (describing the murder of a pedophile
priest by a man who now claims insanity). In another bizarre twist, companies now
advertise for dangerous encounters, including "storm chasing adventures." See Storm
Chasing Tours, http://www.violentskies.com (last visited Mar. 12, 2007); Storm Chasing
and Southwestern Tours, http://www.westernwindstours.com (last visited Mar. 12,
2007).
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dent has occurred? My point here is that policing these lines might
be more difficult than we assume. If we know that our communities
are particularly litigious, how do we counter spurious lawsuits? As
Professor James Henderson concludes, "Courts have refused to im
pose a general duty to rescue largely because it would be unman
ageable as a guide to either primary or adjudicative behavior."47
Nonetheless, some critics contend that the no duty to rescue
rule promotes ambivalence, nonfeasance, passivity, and justifies
anti-cooperative, morally unjustifiable behavior, which, in one way
or another, harms society. Deciding not to rescue, some commen
tators contend, can be a calculated error (i.e., closer to misfeasance)
that reveals the worst in our society and American jurisprudence.
These arguments are persuasive entreaties against the normative in
fluence of individualism, which pervades American society in gen
eral and our jurisprudence in particular. However, as a utilitarian
social policy, these no-duty rules are not absolute; we pay taxes to
subsidize healthcare, welfare, and education-programs among
many for which there is broad social agreement and benefit.
Yet, no matter how we might wrestle with these concepts, our
jurisprudence is intentional and not blind to the moral appeal of
rescue. 48 In a famous opinion, Justice Smith explains:
For withholding relief from the suffering, for failure to respond
to the calls of worthy charity, or for faltering in the bestowment
of brotherly love on the unfortunate, penalties are found not in
the laws of men, but in that higher law, the violation of which is
condemned by the voice of conscience, whose sentence of pun
ishment for the recreant act is swift and sure. In the law of con
tracts it is now well understood that a promise founded on a
moral obligation will not be enforced in the courts. 49

The jurisprudential calculations, if anything, were insightful,
setting a limit to the law's long arm reach into individuals' lives.
According to Justice Smith, only the "omission or negligent dis
charge of legal duties" should "come within the sphere of judicial
cognizance."50 In sum, absent a statutory duty to aid or one's own
negligence, our jurisprudence exempts individuals from liability
should they fail to render aid. In addition, as in the case presented
47. James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
901, 943 (1982).
48. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281, 282-83 (Kan. 1903).
49. /d.
50. Id. at 282.
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by Picoult, the No Duty Rule protects individuals against being
forced to rescue or endanger themselves to aid another.
To extend the Good Samaritan concept to medicine, and espe
cially the harvesting of body parts, is antithetical to an American
way of thinking for a few reasons. Requiring healthy individuals to
undergo non-therapeutic medical surgeries is a disincentive for re
maining healthy. If staying healthy means a reduced expectation of
privacy and autonomy, fewer people would be motivated to stay
healthy. In addition, forcing healthy individuals to share their kid
neys, lobes of livers, and other body parts ostensibly imposes a pen
alty on healthiness. After all, if given a choice, patients will choose
body parts from healthy people. Individuals who smoke, drink, and
consume illicit drugs would have no incentive to curb those behav
iors. Indeed, drinkers, smokers, and drug users would be exempt
from a social policy that primarily burdens healthy people to rescue
the sick. The imposition of rescue rules in medicine is also prob
lematic because the very resources that one surrenders might be
what an individual needs to sustain her life later.
Finally, to some extent, biotechnology drives the demand for
healthcare services with a great imbalance between attention to life
and quality of life concerns. For example, cosmetic surgeries are
incredibly popular and some of the treatments actually derive from
human body parts obtained by tissue banks. The quality of life for
these individuals may be greatly enhanced in the short term, but
with limited attention as to the long-term consequences of some of
the more daring cosmetic treatments or the addictive nature of cos
metic enhancements. 51 Likewise, quality-of-life concerns are com
monly sacrificed in the quest for research knowledge. Neonatology
units within hospitals are increasingly the most profitable among
medical wards; babies born anencephalic (with only a brain stem),
hydrocephalic (a congenital condition in which an abnormal ac
cumulation of fluid in the cerebral ventricles causes enlargement of
the skull and compression of the brain), and with other life-threat
ening conditions are increasingly offered significant research-type
therapies with no proven efficacy beyond extending life a matter of
hours, days, or weeks at most. The costs, emotional, psychological,
and financial, are rarely calculated together and parents are caught
within a complex matrix of moral and legal obligations that are dif
51. Larry King Live: Is Plastic Surgery America's New Addiction? (CNN televi
sion broadcast Jan. 28,2006) (transcript available in two parts at 2006 WLNR 1577669
and 2006 WLNR 1577670 (Westlaw».
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ficult to evaluate. Here, the interests of doctors are not always
squarely in line with those of patients; research interests may con
flict with the best interest of a terminally ill patient.
Medicine cannot be divorced from the laws that regulate it, nor
the social policies that should govern its reach, particularly as re
lated to vulnerable sUbjects. Past medical abuses, including contro
versial international clinical trials that abuse the consent process,
and the U.S. government sponsored clinical trials iilVolving several
hundred illiterate black men from rural Alabama, known as the
Tuskegee Experiment, demonstrate this principle all too clearly.52
Likewise, biotechnology and its beneficial relationship to children
must be explored within the broader dimensions and contexts of the
law and society. To discuss rescue doctrine in the absence of its
social contexts with children illumes only a narrow aspect of it, leav
ing the foreground empty and wanting. Children are uniquely situ
ated within families, where the power relationships are vertical and
their status resides at the bottom.
II.

THE

GlFr

OF LIFE FALLACY: LANGUAGE

&

THE LAW

"We loved you even more," my mother made sure to say, "because
we knew exactly what we were getting. "53

Let us turn to the murkier issue of language and its social con
structions. As Picoult explains, there is the presumption, at least
adopted by some courts, that characterizes living donations from
children to their siblings as providing a "psychological benefit" for
the child donor. Such rationalizations, in addition to ascribing the
term "benefit" to a process that requires non-therapeutic medical
intervention, seem consistent with a preexisting, problematic para
digm. The presumption here is that all gift-giving is good, and that
altruism as a concept in organ donation is pure and unspoiled by
secondary or spurious motivations. This reasoning, as discussed be
low, is seriously flawed.
Far worse, however, is the problem of vernacular in organ
transplantation that extends beyond terminology. Language is
powerful and to the extent that children are involved in organ do
nation, the language of the "gift" may obscure manipUlation, coer
cion, and downright abuse. Compelled organ donation from living
children is but one additional problematic byproduct of the "gift"
52.
53.

supra note 17, at 28-30.
supra note 6, at 8.

GOODWIN,
PICOULT,
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or "altruism" model, and a collateral component of assisted repro
ductive technology and preimplantation genetic disorders. These
cases are primarily an issue in "living donation" rather than cadav
eric donations, where non-therapeutic surgeries are not an issue.
Section A addresses these concerns along with a look at individual
ism and its importance to a critique of altruism and status. Section
B analyzes living donation, first by considering the transplantation
data and then turning to the case law.
A.

The Cloak and Construction of Altruism
Despite the degree to which this metaphor pervades transplanta
tion practice, our studies have demonstrated that "gift-giving" or
altruism is not necessarily the primary motivation when families
decide to donate. Families often donate for nonaltruistic reasons,
for example a desire to see their loved one live on in the
recipient. 54

In January 2006, at the American Association of Law Schools
annual meeting, in his keynote address, the Honorable Guido Cala
bresi encouraged an audience of law professors to scrutinize the
concept of altruism. 55 In his opinion, legal scholars have given a
pass to the concept, suggesting that it is always morally defensible,
possessing higher-order values and no corruption. According to
Calabresi, legal scholars fail to scrutinize the limits and nuances of
altruism. To some, altruism, just as the "gift concept" in transplan
tation, is the unfettered good.
Yet, on inspection, horrible abuses are facilitated in the name
of altruism; slavery was one construction of altruism, forcing Blacks
into free labor; children serving in armies is another, whereby youth
are coerced into "volunteering" for the sake of "saving" their
tribes, governments, or communities; and such sacrifices for the
common good can demand an enormous social price. The moral
value of those types of sacrifices does not pale in the face of individ
ualism. In my opinion, there are some sacrifices that should not
come with applause, lest we encourage unsound behaviors for
which the costs may be socially and legally incalculable or morally
54. Siminoff & Chillag, supra note 18, at 40.
55. Guido Calabresi, U.S. Cir. Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir.,
Keynote Speaker at the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting: The
Lawyer as Institutional Empiricist: The Case of Law and Economics (Jan. 5,2006) (au
dio recording of the speech available at hup:/Iwww3.cali.orglaals06/mp3/AALS2006
CalabresiLuncheon.mp3).
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unjustifiable. Rather, we must be guided by critical thinking as it
relates to altruism. Clinical trials in developing countries are an
other complex form of altruism; pharmaceutical companies donate
medicines to sick populations, but the medicines may not have any
proven efficacy for those populations. Dozens if not hundreds of
people will die from this type of altruism. The patients in these
experiments are altruistic; their sacrifices inure great benefit to
those in the West who will consume the refined pharmaceutical
products.
John Rawls would likely argue against this type of cynicism.
Individualism, according to Rawls's social contract model, should
be supplanted for the betterment of the whole community.56 Social
security is a model of altruism within a social contract framework,
as are the municipal benefits resulting from the taxes we pay.57
George P. Fletcher, a professor of jurisprudence, emphasizes a nor
mative view of social solidarity, communal concern, and a sense of
togetherness, all of which can be satisfied only in a moral commu
nity that is premised on the value of mutual responsibility.58 In this
way, decision-making for the benefit of society inures benefit to the
individual.5 9 Professor Dorothy Brown, a critical race theory
scholar and tax professor, however, challenges the operation of this
type of altruism, noting that it is not impervious to the social crite
ria otherwise used to exclude or punish those considered more
marginalized, less desirable, less trustworthy, or of less value to
society.60
The social contract assumes equal bargaining and acquisition
power, and in our present altruistic organ and tissue donation sys
tems we perhaps presume the same. 61 However, this view of altru
56. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 28-33 (photo. reprint 2005) (1971).
57. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE 335
37 (1997).
58. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS (1993).
59. See CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELA·
TlONS 130-31 (1979).
60. See Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65
u. erN. L. REV. 787 (1997) (arguing that African American families are more likely to
pay a marriage penalty than white families because black women tend to contribute a
larger portion of their households' income than white women, which results in a more
significant "penalty" for black families); see also Patricia Hill Collins, African-American

Women and Economic Justice: A Preliminary Analysis of Wealth, Family, and African
American Social Class, 65 U. erN. L. REV. 825 (1997).
61. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 3, 19, 82, 88, 100, 144
(1970); Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous
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ism in the transplantation and broader body parts industry does not
ask whether all individuals are situated similarly, even within fami
lies, particularly children and the mentally il1. 62 Theories of altru
ism, including Rawls's theory of social justice and fairness, are
intended for democratic societies that adhere to non-discriminatory
principles. But such altruistic theories, even if appealing, do not
consider law and status as we know it in our society. So they tend
to overlook preexisting imbalances in society and the compromised
status of those traditionally marginalized or discriminated against,
such as children whose authority is subordinate to that of their par
ents.63 Understanding the nuances of status and language is critical
to the study of organ transplantation, particularly donation, and
shows why, as Siminoff and Chillag assert, the "gift" concept does
not work. 64 These nuances are indicated in the law's treatment of
these issues as described and analyzed herein. 65
The power of altruism resides in the performance of selfless,
voluntary acts, which deprive us of some value or object that inevi
tably has some worth associated with it, in order to achieve a social
good. 66 These deprivations are usually tangible and may be finan
cial, such as salary, labor, and stocks, or those instruments that are
more personal, such as a home, car, clothes, shoes, or time. At
times, these deprivations are temporary, owing to the fact that we
might inherit or be the eventual beneficiaries of our own "selfless"
Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 567, 585 (stating that "altruistic gifts make the beneficiary
better off, because the beneficiary prefers the gift to nothing; and they make the donor
better off because the donor derives utility from the donee's increase in utility"). See
generally FLETCHER, supra note 58.
62. See, e.g., Martha E. Ertman, What's Wrong with a Parenthood Market?: A
New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REv. 1, 19 (2003) (declaring
that sperm donor anonymity "is crucial because family law often links biology to paren
tal rights and responsibilities").
63. See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law: Organ
Taking, Racial Profiling & Distributive Justice, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2001) (critiquing
the moral and legal legitimacy of presumed consent statutes that allow for the noncon
sensual removal of tissues from cadavers and their disparate impact on communities of
color).
64. See Siminoff & Chillag, supra note 18.
65. Posner, supra note 61, at 567 (postulating that gift-giving's social value is de
rived from "its role in nonlegal relationships, and therefore efforts to regulate it with
the law would reduce its value").
66. Cf Marie-Andree Jacob, On Silencing and Slicing: Presumed Consent to Post
Mortem Organ "Donation" in Diversified Societies, 11 TULSA J. COMPo & INT'L L. 239,
242 (2003) (articulating a communitarian perspective on organ giving, suggesting that
when individuals die, their legacy is best served by organ donations).
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good deeds. 67 Perhaps the jewelry we buy our grandmothers will
one day be worn by our daughters or the paintings we donate to a
museum will be viewed and enjoyed by all in our community.68 In
some instances, perhaps we are motivated by other benefits, such as
tax credits. 69 Those motivations, however, indicate the nebulous
nature of altruism; acts otherwise perceived as selfless may have
underlying motivations. Through our taxes we support educating
children, hoping they are better prepared to administer our govern
ment and cities when we become older and vulnerable, thereby in
vesting in a future type of social safety.70 In these instances, the
gifting is not entirely altruistic, but strategic planning.
In the realm of organ donation, such deeds are often referred
to as "gifts" and "mirac1es."71 Indeed, therein exists the power to
love and the will to be generous absent our own desires. The enor
mity of such emotions can never be underestimated as it is part of a
host of dynamics located within organ and tissue donation; it can be
an incredible motivator to perform acts of kindness.72 Yet, living
donation cases, particularly those involving children, are deeply
nuanced and may be influenced by a host of factors too difficult to
67. See ANNA FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE 125-27
(Cecil Baines trans., International Universities Press 1966) (1936) (challenging broad
assumptions about selflessness and altruism).
68. Cf Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 175
(2000). Mahoney writes about the chains of altruism and bargaining. Although individ
uals are strongly presumed to be altruistic in their dispensation of body parts, those
involved in the asking may be motivated by other impulses, including commercialism
and greed.
69. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Struc
ture: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1940 (1987) (relating
the favorable tax consequences of nonprofit donations and other investments that are
thought to be desirable for society and are thus encouraged by the tax code); Frederick
R. Parker, Jr. et aI., Organ Procurement and Tax Policy, 2002 Hous. J. HEALTH L. &
POL'y 173, 175-76 (speaking to how financial incentives might encourage greater "altru
ism" in organ donation).
70. See Cynthia E. Garabedian, Note, Tax Breaks for Higher Education: Tax Pol
icy or Tax Pandering?, 18 V A. TAX REV. 217, 218 (1998) (analyzing tax schemes and
their impact on education financing).
71. See PICOULT, supra note 6, at 100; Organ Donation: Miracles Come From
Tragedy, WICHITA FALLS MED. MAG., http://www.medmag.org!miracle.html (last vis
ited Feb. 14,2007) (providing testimonials about Gloria Key Harrison, whose death and
subsequent organ donations benefited fifty people).
72. Although, there are other motivating factors contributing to organ donation.
For example, some scholars have suggested that payments could be capped or in the
form of tax incentives. See Fred H. Cate, Human Organ Transplantation: The Role of
Law, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 69, 85-86 (1994) (arguing that compensation could be a mo
tivator for organ donation); see also PICOULT, supra note 6, at 389-92.
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monitor and predict, including guilt, coercion, and shame.73 These
transactions involving child-donors certainly are not altruistic.
Picoult persuasively argues that compelled donation from children
is the most basic form of objectification: "I am afraid of what might
happen to Kate while her sister is gone. If Kate survives this latest
relapse, who knows how long it will be before another crisis hap
pens? And when it does, we will need Anna-her blood, her stem
cells, her tissue-right here."74 But our limited vernacular for
describing the processes born out of rapidly expanding biotechnol
ogy leaves us at a loss. Even courts reinforce the limited vernacular
of the transplantation industry.75 In Georgia Lions Eye Bank, for
example, the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed parents' claims
where their deceased son's corneas were removed without consent,
claiming that the state statute that authorized such harvesting was
legitimate because it benefited others. 76 The language of "benefit"
and "gifting" to others pervades such cases.
Picoult suggests that courts are not the best bodies to deal with
compelled organ surrender, nor do legislative alternatives appear
on the horizon. Congress has not spoken on the issue; there are no
federal regulations or guidelines about appropriateness of age for
child or incompetent donation. Courts are left to resolve the legal
and moral tensions, with parents forcing children to donate to sib
lings, mostly in cases where hospitals or physicians have sought de
claratory judgments (to avoid liability should mistakes occur during
tissue or organ harvesting). The jurisprudence in this area must be
come more nuanced in light of the potential for coercion, confusion,
manipulation, and conflicts of interest not only among physicians,
but also parents. Indeed, each case of compelled organ donation
involves competing interests among parents, physicians, courts, and
children.

73. PICOULT, supra note 6, at 270-74.
74. Id. at 269.
75. See Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ga. 1985)
("Certainly, the General Assembly has it within its power, in the interest of the public
welfare, to authorize this procedure, which yearly benefits hundreds of Georgians.").
76. Id. at 128-29.
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Living Donations
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The most dramatic increase in the altruistic pool, as charted
above, are living donations, which have steadily increased, while the
increase in deceased donations has tapered. In 2003, living dona
tions outpaced deceased donations,78 For example, in 1994, de
ceased donors represented 5,099 organ contributions, while living
individuals donated 3,102 organs,79 By 2003, deceased donations
had risen to 6,455, while living donations reached 6,820. 80 Most liv
ing donors who contribute to the organ pool are relatives providing
direct donations to sick family members. Siblings comprise the
largest donor pool.81

77. Graph derived from data in ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION
NETWORK, ANN. REP. 1-1 tbl.l.1 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 ANN. REP.], available at
http://www.optn.orglAR2005/default.htm (click link for "Download 2005 Annual
Report"); ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, ANN. REP. 1-1
tbl.l.1 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 ANN. REP.], available at http://www.optn.orglAR2004/
default.htm (click link for "Download 2004 Annual Report").
78. 2004 ANN. REP., supra note 77, at 1-1 tbl.1.1; ORGAN PROCUREMENT &
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, ANN. REP. 1-1 tbl.1.1 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 ANN.
REP.], available at http://www.optn.org/AR2005/default.htm (click link for "Download
2003 Annual Report").
79. Interview with Jack Lynch, Dir. of Cmty. Affairs, Gift of Hope Organ and
Tissue Donor Network (Jan. 5, 2007).
80. 2003 ANN. REP., supra note 78, at 1-1 tbl.l.1; 2004 ANN. REP., supra note 77,
at 1-1 tbl.1.1.
81. 2003 ANN. REP., supra note 78, at 2-30 tbI.2.8; 2004 ANN. REP., supra note 77,
at 2-30 tbI.2.8.
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To what can we attribute this trend, and is it significant? Does
it indicate anything about American law, ethics, and social values?
We could read the outpacing phenomenon as Americans' reluc
tance to participate in blind, anonymous, and altruistic processes
where they help others whom they do not know. 83 This may be less
true outside the transplantation context. According to one court,
"our society, contrary to many others, has as its first principle, the
respect for the individual, and that society and government exist to
protect the individual from being invaded and hurt by another."84
Thus, purely altruistic transfers involving deceased donations are
perhaps truly outside of American norms.85 Such generosity may
be inconsistent with the general framework of our daily lives; there
is no duty to rescue someone in harm's way even when doing so
would pose minimal risks and be cost effective. 86
The rise in living donors could also indicate that the psycholog
ical bonds of family relationships carryover or may be intensified
during illnesses, thereby stimulating a sibling's willingness to un
82. Graph derived from data in 2004 ANN. REp., supra note 77, at 2-30 tbI.2.8.
83. Peter M. Agulnik & Heidi V. Rivkin, Criminal Liability for Failure to Rescue:
A Brief Survey of French and American Law, 8 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 93,96-97 (1998)
(arguing that "[d]eeply ingrained in the American psyche is the individual's desire to
live free from governmental interference. American law has long respected the auton
omy of the individual and has been reluctant to punish for failure to rescue.").
84. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91 (1978).
85. Adam J. Kolber, A Matter of Priority: Transplanting Organs Preferentially to
Registered Donors, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 671, 697 (2003) (arguing that "[t]he altruistic
motivation to donate has proven itself woefully insufficient, and while many preach that
it should be sufficient, people on organ waiting lists are dying at an average rate of
sixteen per day in the United States").
86. Robert J. Lipkin, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An Individu
alistic Justification of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REv. 252,253-54
(1983) (positing that "[t]here is no general legal duty to rescue in most Anglo-American
jurisdictions"). There are special relationships in which the law requires a duty to res
cue. For example, a carrier has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to rescue a passen
ger, Middleton v. Whitridge, 108 N.E. 192 (N.Y. 1915), and an innkeeper must aid a
guest in case of fire, West v. Spratling, 86 So. 32 (Ala. 1920).
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dergo invasive, potentially dangerous surgeries. 87 Perhaps also the
spiritual and psychological benefits that inure may be long lasting
and indescribable. 88 Courts have suggested that this "psychological
benefit is grounded firmly in the fact that the donor and recipient
are known to each other as family."89 Beyond the psychological
benefits experienced by donors, might there be other factors moti
vating living donations?
Within the living donor context, wherein more donations are
harvested than through the purely blind process, time and emotions
are pivotal issues; the imminence of death is part of that reality.90
Indeed, coercion, pressure, and feelings of entitlement may arise in
these time-sensitive, life-threatening situations from both family
members and doctors. 91 For the donee, the tyranny of the gift may
be the oppression of the debt itself, an inability to ever repay.92
Consider the predicament of cousins in McFall v. Shimp,93 a note
worthy case because it addresses emotions, expectations, and legal
dilemmas involved with the "living donor" subset of altruism.
87. But see Howard S. Schwartz, Bioethical and Legal Considerations in Increas
ing the Supply of Transplantable Organs: From UAGA to "Baby Fae", 10 AM. J.L. &
MED. 397,423-24 (1985) (commenting on intra-family reluctance to participate in organ
donation, finding "[n]ot infrequently, related potential donors ask the physician to in
form the family that he or she is not a 'good match' in order to relieve these pres
sures"). See also Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969); Little v. Little, 576
S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
88. See Michael T. Morley, Note, Proxy Consent to Organ Donation by Incompe
tents, 111 YALE L.J. 1215, 1222-23 (2002) (quoting Ingela Fehrman-Ekholm et aI., Kid
ney Donors Don't Regret, 69 TRANSPLANTATION 2067, 2069 (2000)) (pointing out that
"in a study of 451 living kidney donors with a 92% response rate, 'almost all of them felt
that the donation affected their lives in a positive way. . .. Of particular interest was
that only three (0.8%) of the donors regretted the donation, two were undecided
(0.5%), and thus almost 99% reported that they did not regret their decision."').
89. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1343 (III. 1990).
90. See Schwartz, supra note 87, at 429 (quoting Jean Hamburger & Jean Cros
nier, Moral and Ethical Problems in Transplantation, in HUMAN TRANSPLANTATION 37
38 (F.T. Rappaport & J. Dausset eds., 1968)) ("While it is conceivable that a mother,
father, or sibling may have sound psychological reasons to become volunteer donors,
experience indicates that individuals who write to a transplant center in order to donate
a kidney to a prospective recipient to whom they are not connected by any kind of
emotional tie are frequently pathologic by psychiatric criteria.").
91. Joel D. KalIich & Jon F. Merz, The Transplant Imperative: Protecting Living
Donors from the Pressure to Donate, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 139, 143-44 (1994).
92. Mark F. Anderson, The Future of Organ Transplantation: From Where Will
New Donors Corne, To Whom Will Their Organs Go?, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 249, 267
(1995). Anderson argues that "[w]e should not subject the families of potential cadav
eric organ donors to this kind of emotional upheaval against their will. Instead, we
should protect the emotional health of those who survive and not focus completely on
the desires of those who no longer have emotions to experience." Id.
93. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978).
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McFall v. Shimp

In McFall v. Shimp the plaintiff, Robert McFall, suffered from
a rare bone marrow disease, aplastic anemia, and death was immi
nent absent a bone marrow transplant from a suitable donor. 94 Af
ter an arduous search, including locating and testing six siblings
split apart through his parents' divorce, it was determined that only
the defendant, the plaintiff's cousin Robert Shimp was a suitable
donor. 95 Shimp agreed to be tested, which involved minimally inva
sive blood analysis. 96 However, Shimp later refused to provide
bone marrow even though he was the only perfect match. 97 This
was surely a grave and difficult time for both men and their fami
lies,98 The most important legal question was whether the law had
a role at all in their personal controversy. The cousins were very
good friends, and McFall recalled, "I used to buy gifts for his chil
dren when they were little. We [were] good friends."99 Even
Shimp's children volunteered as donors, but none of the four were
matches. 100
This case provides a provocative backdrop for the study of
compelled body-part donation. It tested whether a person can be
forced to be altruistic, which of course does not mean that he is
altruistic, but that he has been forced to be a bone marrow donor.
The case was not unique, in that it was not the first to address the
question of compelled donation, but all earlier cases involved per
sons who were legally incompetent,101 In effect, those earlier cases
involved incompetent minors and the mentally incompetent, a
marked difference from McFall, which involved the consent of a
competent adult.
Judge Flaherty, the lone justice hearing the case, required
Shimp to submit a brief to the court documenting why he should
not be compelled to save his cousin's life. Shortly thereafter, the
court denied McFall's injunction. In a noteworthy dictum, however,
Id.
Dennis Williams, Bad Samaritan, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1978, at 35.
Id.
Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1343 (Ill. 1990); see also Estate of
Longeway v. Cmty. Convalescent Ctr., 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1990); Estate of Greenspan
v. Gelman, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. 1990).
94.

95.
96.
97.
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Judge Flaherty took the liberty to characterize Robert Shimp's de
cision as "morally indefensible."102
What are we to understand from each of the parties' actions
Shimp, McFall, and the court? The McFall dilemma is significant
not only for the study of transplant jurisprudence, but also because
it marks the conflicts between individualism and altruism. Judge
Flaherty'S opinion is unambiguous; a dying person does not possess
a special right to invade his cousin's body even if to save his own
life. McFall v. Shimp remains, however, an interesting test case,
particularly because it involved bone marrow donation and not or
gan donation. Bone marrow transplantation is considered far less
invasive than the surgery required to harvest an organ. 103 Thus, al
though the court took notice of the potential for harm to result, its
main emphasis was not so much the process of donation, but rather
Judge Flaherty focused on "respect for the individual."104 The
court made clear that altruism cannot be compelled, and indeed,
donation cannot really be a gift if it is mandated.
The government, through its judiciary, is not in the position to
"change every concept and principle upon which our society is
founded."lo5 And while cases like Brown v. Board of Education 106
challenge that notion (i.e., the role of the judiciary to bring about
social change), ultimately to compel an individual to submit to a
non-therapeutic surgery, which in the process violates her privacy,
is an incredibly dangerous legal construct.107 Where would such le
gal rules end? Could a domestic partner have a legal right to her
partner's reproductive material? Could a husband have a legal
right to demand sex from his wife? The media characterized Shimp
a "Bad Samaritan," but Judge Flaherty'S denial of the injunction
was not an egregious error. 108 Rather, it demonstrated American
jurisprudence in action. After all, we abjure rescue doctrine; the
law does not require a duty to aid or rescue when a victim is in
danger. In preserving such "no duty" rules, we are bound to cause
harms, but they too must be weighed against other values in a just
102. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91 (1978).
103. See, e.g., Nat'l Marrow Donor Program, ABCs of Marrow or Blood Cell
Donation, http://www.marrow.org/DONOR/ABCs/index.html(last visited Feb. 14,
2007) ("Most donors are back to their usual routine in a few days.").
104. McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 9l.
105. Id.
106. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
107. This concept would resemble slavery far more than would cadaveric organ
incentives.
108. Williams, supra note 95.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

388

[Vol. 29:357

society, which in this case was protecting Shimp from the tyranny of
McFall. Reconciling the case with international precedent, how
ever, is a different matter.
McFall, having found no U.S. judicial authority to support his
case, relied on a seven hundred year old statute, hoping the court
would find that in order to preserve or save the life of another, a
society has the right to impose upon an individual's right to "bodily
security."109 According to Judge Flaherty,
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides
that one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or
to take action to save another human being or to rescue. A great
deal has been written regarding this rule which, on the surface,
appears to be revolting in a moral sense. Introspection, however,
will demonstrate that the rule is founded upon the very essence
of our free society.ll0

Indeed, McFall's theory of compelled donation does not reflect
the development of American jurisprudence, which contrary to
others cited by McFall, "has as its first principle, the respect for the
individual."111 Great moral conflicts will result from strict interpre
tations of individual rights. 112 As biotechnology progresses, con
flicts will often attend that progress. Within weeks after Judge
Flaherty's seminal decision, nearly to the day, Robert McFall
died. 113
2.

Curran v. Bosze

In a later decision, Curran v. Bosze,114 the Illinois Supreme
Court followed the same line of jurisprudence extolled in McFall,
opining that an individual's altruism cannot be legally compelled by
a relative,115 The Curran case is significant for three reasons. First,
it introduced and responded to a conceptual nuance not at issue in
McFall, specifically, compelled donations from minors not only for
their siblings, but presumably also for other relatives. Second, it
introduced a framework, involving a three-prong test, for deciding
whether a parent's decision to compel his children to donate against
109. McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 90-91 (indicating that the plaintiff had cited 81
Westminster 2, 13 Ed. 1. c. 24 in his brief).
110. Id. at 91.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Died, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1978, at 79.
114. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).
115. Id. at 1345.
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the wishes of the other parent will be legally enforced. Third, it
speaks to the emotional and psychological issues involving blended
families, presaging future dynamics in tissue transplantation.
The question before the court in Curran was whether a non
custodial parent, Mr. Tamas Bosze, could compel the production of
his three-year-old twins for blood testing and possible bone marrow
harvesting in order to save the life of their twelve-year-old half
brother, Jean Pierre, who would surely die without the trans
plant,116 Their mother, Ms. Nancy Curran, the twins' legal guard
ian, refused to provide consent for the procedure, leaving the court
to decide, not only a case of first impression, but one which would
shape future jurisprudence on altruistic donations from minors,117
Two decisions were issued; first a pronouncement from the court in
September 1990, and later a written ruling.
Just days before Christmas, on December 20, 1990, judges of
the Illinois Supreme Court delivered their written opinion announc
ing why they refused to grant Mr. Bosze's request for an injunction
to compel Ms. Curran to produce the twins for blood testing and
bone-marrow harvesting. The court refused to invoke a more than
century-old legal tenet to substitute its judgment for that of the chil
dren, instead upholding a lower court decision that the blood test
and possible transplant would be an invasion of the twins' pri
vacy.118 Traditionally, a court may substitute judgment in cases
where individuals lack capacity to make sound decisions for them
selves, either due to youth, illness, or psychological or mental in
ability.119 Had the court substituted its judgment for that of the
twins, doing so, according to their guardian ad litem, would have
established a dangerous precedent. 120
However, that precedent was previously established by the Illi
nois Supreme Court in both the Longeway121 and Greenspan 122 de
cisions, involving substituted judgment for incompetent adults. In
both cases, the court permitted the substituted judgments of incom
petent patients for the purpose of removing artificial nutrition and
116.
117.
118.
119.

120.
24, 1990,
121.
122.

[d. at 1321.
[d.
[d. at 1339.
[d. at 1331.

See Andrew Fegelman, Guardian Allowed to Talk To Twins, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
at C4, available at 1990 WLNR 3716429 (Westlaw).
Estate of Longeway v. Cmty. Convalescent Ctr., 549 N.E.2d 292 (III. 1990).
Estate of Greenspan v. Gelman, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (III. 1990).

390

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:357

hydration, which would most certainly result in death. 123 The court
declined to adopt the best interest standard in both cases, opining
instead that the record in both cases demonstrated the relevancy of
substituted judgment theory.124 Ultimately, the court avoided ad
dressing the more troubling ethical issues presented by the best in
terest standard; namely, is the death that results from the
discontinuance of hydration and nutrition in the best interest of a
patient? Is it ever in the best interest of a patient, particularly one
who is incompetent, to have hydration and nutrition withdrawn? In
the case of a child donor, is the removal of healthy bone marrow or
a vital organ ever in her best interest?
By the time the written opinion was issued, Jean Pierre had
died. 125 Curran v. Bosze is not an uncomplicated case nor is it free
from moral doubt; it is emotionally compelling because a child
would surely die, and saving his life might require so little from his
siblings. 126 But there are risks. During the procedure, the donor is
anesthetized and harvesting can be painful. Subsequent pain can be
treated through postoperative medication. 127
However, Jean Pierre had no relationship with his half brother
and sister; they were, in the eyes of the court, practically stran
gers. 128 We are left to ponder whether social relationships should
trump biological relationships as the court sets out. Families today
are a blend of biological, legal, and social connections. Biological
lines alone, according to the court, may be insufficiently narrow and
other factors more relevant. But is the court right? Where is the
pragmatic line to be drawn in familial altruism? Ironically, in order
to confirm paternity for child support, Ms. Curran previously had
the twins appear for blood testing, only a year before. 129 Whose
123. Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 297-98; Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d
at 1195.
124. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1326.
125. See Boy at Center of Suit for a Marrow Donor Is Dead of Leukemia, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1990, at B9, available at 1990 WLNR 3051099 (Westlaw).
126. See Janet B. Korins, Curran v. Bosze: Toward a Clear Standard for Authoriz
ing Kidney and Bone Marrow Transplants Between Minor Siblings, 16 VT. L. REV. 499,
502 (1992).
127. Id.
128. Bryan Shartle, Comment, Proposed Legislation for Safely Regulating the In
creasing Number of Living Organ and Tissue Donations by Minors, 61 LA. L. REV. 433,
458 (2001).
129. Curran and Bosze were paramours in a conflicted relationship, at once en
gaged, and later feuding over paternity, which ironically was settled through the twins
being subjected to a blood test when they were one year old at the behest of Curran.
See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1320.
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best interest was the Illinois Supreme Court to consider: the twins,
Jean Pierre, or the parents? The difficulty here is determining how
a court should balance the withholding of life-saving transplanta
tion from one child and the infliction of an invasive procedure on a
healthy child. The court's three-prong analysis attempts to answer
these questions.
The Curran court held that a parent or guardian may consent
on behalf of minor children to donate bone marrow to a sibling only
when to do so would have been in the minors' best interest. 13o The
court addressed three critical factors necessary for a determination
of that kind. First, the consenting parent must have been informed
of the risks and the benefits of the procedure. 131 Second, there
must have been emotional support available to the donor child
from his or her caretakers.132 Third, there must have been an ex
isting, close relationship between the donor and recipient. 133
Here, there was no existing, close relationship between the
half-siblings who shared the same biological father, but different
mothers.13 4 At the mother's request, the children were never in
formed that Jean Pierre was their brother. 135 Consequently, the
court indicated, the limited time the siblings shared was insufficient
to prove a close relationship.136 As for altruism, the test seems to
address the altruism of the parents more than that of the chil
dren. 137 Does the best interest of the twins shift according to their
age, custodial parent's consent, quality of the relationship to the
donor? Had the twins been seven years old, instead of three, would
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
note 125.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1343-44.
Id. at 1343.
Id.
Id.
See Boy at Center of Suit for a Marrow Donor Is Dead of Leukemia, supra

Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1344.
Id. at 1344-45.
See Barbara Redman, Rethinking the Progressive Estate and Gift Tax, 15 AK
RON TAX J. 35, 48-49 (2000). Redman argues that altruistic concerns for children's
wellbeing spring from an extension of a "household production model." /d. In that
model, parental utility encompassed the utility of children. She writes:
This model's predictions include bequests to children by such "altruistic" par
ents, even if the children behave selfishly. In fact, the "rotten kid" of this
theorem finds it in his/her own self-interest to help the altruistic parent maxi
mize family income, though only if the parent retains the last word (that is, the
ability to make bequests). Soon, however, researchers presented an alterna
tive explanation for bequests to children, that of exchange for services
rendered.
Id.
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that have made a difference in their ability to consent, thereby
bypassing their mother's objection? According to the court, the an
swer would be "no" if the mother could not or refused to provide
the psychological support necessary under the "caretaker" prong.13B
Commentators have since suggested that Curran may have been le
gally right, but morally wrong.
The Curran holding demonstrates the nascent qualities of this
fluid jurisprudence. As discussed later, the law is incoherent with
regard to compelled living donations, and the underlying dynamics
of each transaction may be ambiguous and troubling. Also, it
seems apparent in the broader jurisprudence involving tough medi
cal decisions that technology outpaces both legislative responses
and judicial decision-making, creating gaps in the rule of law.13 9
Ergo, we have at least four bypro ducts of this jurisprudence that
together seem inconsistent and open for interpretation.
The first is the court's unequivocal position that it does not
recognize and will not enforce a social, altruistic duty for potential
donors to assist relatives, even siblings, by undergoing minimally
invasive, non-therapeutic procedures when the prospective donor
cannot formulate consent. 140 In fact, the court relies upon testi
mony from psychologists and pediatric surgeons urging the court to
protect potential donors from invasive procedures, even where the
risk is minimal, if a psychological benefit cannot be attained. 141
Second, the court does not and will not assume that a psycho
logical benefit naturally arises from bone marrow donation and ar
guably more invasive transplantations, seemingly dismissing any
possible claims to the contrary, which can be inferred from feder
ally supported public service announcements and state sponsored
advertisement campaigns encouraging organ donation. 142 Clear
and convincing evidence must be presented that a potential donor
138. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1344-45.
139. See Rebecca C. Morgan, How to Decide: Decisions on Life-Prolonging Pro
cedures, 20 STETSON L. REV. 77, 102 (1990) (arguing that "statutes cannot anticipate
every situation or factual pattern, and medical technology advances faster than law").
140. See Robert W. Griner, Live Organ Donations Between Siblings and the Best
Interest Standard: Time for Stricter Judicial Intervention, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 599
(1994).
141. Id. at 589; see also Shartie, supra note 128, at 467 (arguing for the use of
expert testimony, oral or otherwise, to determine the consent of minors to organ and
tissue donation).
142. See Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's Most
Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L.
& MED. 45, 90 (1995).
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will psychologically benefit from providing tissue, bone marrow, or
an organ. 143 This can perhaps be accomplished through a showing
of an "existing, close relationship" between the potential donor and
recipient. 144 It seems possible, based on the ruling that as long as
there is an existing, close relationship that will likely continue, the
donor child will be psychologically benefited, thereby satisfying the
third prong.
Third, the court makes subtle distinctions about the nature of
the family relationship between potential donors and recipients but
fails to erect boundaries or give guidance. What weight should be
given to biological status in familial relationships? In Curran, half
sibling, rather than full-blood status, was emphasized, but what
does it mean when considering "family"? Because the court recog
nized the biological status, but not the "family status" of the chil
dren, the twins were barred from donating their bone marrow,145
Thus, biological status would seem rather irrelevant, whether the
potential donor was a half brother, full sister, or a step-sister,146
What will matter to the court is the "existing, close relationship,"
one of the prongs in its three-part analysis, which in the future may
prove just as problematic,147 After all, foster children can develop
close relationships with each other or their host families, and be
cause some placements are semi-permanent it may be possible to
continue the relationship.148 The court leaves open the possibility
of clever adults applying the rule in cases where there are no bio
143. See Maria N. Morelli, Note, Organ Trafficking: Legislative Proposals to Pro
tect Minors, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 917, 942 (1995) ("Courts undergo [a] balanc
ing process in order to ascertain whether the donation serves the [donor's] best
interests"); Cara Cheyette, Note, Organ Harvests from the Legally Incompetent: An Ar
gument Against Compelled Altruism, 41 B.C. L. REV. 465,493-94 (2000) (arguing that
"[s]ome courts seek to balance the relative harms to which donors and recipients will be
subjected, or alternatively, the relative benefits donors and recipients will realize").
144. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1343 (Ill. 1990); see Sheila R. Kirschen
baum, Banking on Discord: Property Conflicts in the Transplantation of Umbilical Cord
Stem Cells, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1391, 1411-12 (1997) (finding that "[t]he similarities be
tween kidney or bone marrow transplants and umbilical cord blood transplants are mul
tiple and obvious").
145. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1344.
146. See id. at 1343-44; see also Jennifer K. Robbennolt et aI., Advancing the
Rights of Children and Adolescents to be Altruistic; Bone Marrow Donation by Minors,
9 J.L. & HEALTH 213, 231 (1994).
147. See Banks, supra note 142, at 89.
148. See Shannon H. Smith, Ignorance is Not Bliss: Why a Ban on Human Clon
ing is Unacceptable, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 311, 327 (1999) (critiquing the Curran court's
use of "'existing close relationship' with the 'substantial benefit' to the donor notion in
determining what is in the donor's best interests"). Smith asserts that "[i]n order to find
an existing close relationship, however there must necessarily be an existing donor, who
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logical relationships, but long-standing intimate social relationships,
as is the case with children in foster care.
The Curran court declined the opportunity to address poten
tial, but likely, parent or guardian conflicts of interest in such
cases. 149 Based on the court's analysis, it is sufficient that the par
ent be aware of the risks, consent on behalf of the child, and give
emotional support,150 With such limited guidance, adopting the
best interest standard might have less significance and meaning for
children's interests in light of the test established. 151
Finally, perhaps neither the substituted judgment theory nor
the best interest standard, as enforced by the court, are appropriate
for organ donation involving children,152 This is not to suggest that
the ultimate decision would be different were a more nuanced the
oryapplied. Rather, the jurisprudence might stretch and develop in
ways that specifically address this new frontier of problems, rather
than relying upon doctrines which did not anticipate our foray into
transplantation regimes. Indeed, it would always seem against the
best interest of a child to submit to non-therapeutic surgeries. 153
Such invasive procedures pose health risks, including the potential
for complications with anesthesia, difficulties during the operation,
the need for possible post-operative blood transfusions, and other
problems unique to the particular type of harvesting. 154 Yet, the
moral questions are not insignificant.
Substituting judgment may also pose difficulties as it requires
assessing prior manifestations of intent,155 How does a three year
has had the opportunity (and time) to form a close bond with the recipient." [d. at 327
28.
149. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1337.
150. See Shartle, supra note 128, at 458-59.
151. See Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications of Human Clon
ing, 42 ARIZ. L. REv. 647, 660-01 (2000).
152. See Deborah K. McKnight & Maureen Bellis, Foregoing Life-Sustaining
Treatment for Adult, Developmentally Disabled, Public Wards: A Proposed Statute, 18
AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 223 (1992) (arguing against the substituted judgment standard
because it lacks objective content).
153. See Dwight Newman, An Examination of Saskatchewan Law on the Steriliza
tion of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 62 SASK. L. REv. 329, 332 (1999) (suggesting
that non-therapeutic surgeries can never be in the' best interest of the patient, even
when parents and guardians are involved).
154. See Rosato, supra note 2, at 57 (stating that organ donation is always, by
definition, non-therapeutic, and therefore, even with parental consent, such operations
must be strictly scrutinized by courts).
155. See Thomas J. Brindisi, Note, Right to Die-Court Requires Clear and Con
vincing Evidence of Persistent Vegetative Patient's Intent to Terminate Life Sustaining
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old manifest her intent to donate bone marrow or a kidney?156 As
for evidence of intent, what should a guardian ad litem look for?157
What gestures or actions indicate an intent to donate prior to the
manifestation of your sibling's illness? What type of inquiry should
be made to uncover evidence of intent? Can intent be influenced
by parents, thereby undermining the court's scientific inquiry?
To conclude, neither McFall nor Curran represents exclusively
the jurisprudence on living donations. Rather, they represent one
aspect of the coin. The other, equally nuanced aspect of this juris
prudence is alluded to in Curran. Within it are the judicial struggles
involving conflicts of interest and mental incompetence. Within the
gaps of legislative guidance and nascent jurisprudence, further nu
ances are born.
III.

EUGENICS, SOCIAL VALUING, AND THE MENTALLY
INCOMPETENT SAMARITAN

Let us now turn to where I believe the "right to use" another's
body part derived from. Indeed, it is a double standard in the law.
Curran is the outlier; the court rejected the notion that twins who
barely knew that they had another sibling should surrender blood
and possibly bone marrow. 15S However, Curran is inconsistent with
a robust body of case law and medical precedent documented in the
media. Consider the births of Adam Nash and Marissa Ayala who
were created expressly to supply body parts for their siblings. The
Nashes are thought to be America's first couple to screen their em
bryos before implanting them in the mother's womb for the pur
pose of harvesting bone marrow. 159 In that case, the parents were
Procedures; Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 Casts New Light on Outcome, 23 U.
BALT. L. REV. 619, 623 (1994).
156. Or, how does a mentally incompetent manifest intent? See In re Moe, 432
N.E.2d 712, 720 (Mass. 1982) (acknowledging the potential slippery slope in pursuing
substituted jUdgment).
157. See Anne Marie Gaudin, Note, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health: To Die or Not to Die: That is the Question-But Who Decides?, 51 LA. L. REv.
1307, 1322 (1991) (suggesting that if clear and convincing evidence is lacking, the court
might look to a conversation between the patient and another); Cruzan ex rei. v. Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,285 (1990). Cruzan is perhaps one of the seminal cases
involving evidence of consent from a third party. In the case, the Court considered
testimony of a conversation between Nancy Cruzan and her roommate. Id. at 268. In
the conversation, Nancy is said to have communicated her desires as to treatment op
tions were she to become vegetative. Id.
158. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1390 (Ill. 1990).
159. See Jeffrey P. Kahn, Making Lives to Save Lives, CNN.coM, Oct. 16,2000,
http://www.cnn.com/2000IHEALTH/10/16/ethics.matters/index. html (asserting that
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able to successfully use Adam's cord blood, but were seemingly
prepared for a more invasive donation were it necessary to save
their daughter's life. However, twelve years before, Abe Ayala sur
gically reversed his vasectomy, hoping that his wife would become
pregnant with a child who could save their eldest daughter's life. 160
The couples were very different; one Hispanic and the other
white, hailing from different regions in the United States. The Nash
family lived in Colorado and the Ayalas in California. The couples,
however, were motivated by similar desires. Both were unwilling to
accept the inevitable deaths of their daughters. The Nash family
followed the development of preimplantation genetic diagnosis, a
process involving the removal of a single cell from embryos created
through standard in vitro fertilization techniques and developed in
a laboratory petri dish. 161 Before implantation in the uterus, the
embryos were tested for Fanconi Anemia, the genetic blood disease
from which their daughter suffered, and those exhibiting no signs of
the disease were implanted. 162
The births of Adam and Marissa raise serious doubts about the
confluence of the rule of law, biotechnology, ethics, and parenting.
Although an effort to ban "transplantation" parenting in England
was recently overturned, U.S. legislators and courts have yet to ad
dress the issue of reproductive altruism, the practice of having chil
dren to save the lives of other children. 163 Neither federal nor state
law establishes limits on who can parent, nor on how many children
couples may produce, or when or under what circumstances they
may reproduce. Save for child sexual abuse resulting in

screening embryos to choose a bone marrow donor "crossed an important line"); Birth
of a u.s. Boy as Donor Raises Ethical Question, CNN.COM, Oct. 3, 2000, http://www.
cnn.coml2000IHEALTHIlO/03/genetics.ethics.reut (noting that "if the [stem cell trans
plant] did not work [the alternative would be] to harvest bone marrow from the boy, a
potentially risky procedure").
160. See Mary B. Mahowald, Genes, Clones, and Gender Equality, 3 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 495, 513 (2000) (discussing the story of the Ayala family).
161. See Donrich W. Jordaan, Preimplantation Genetic Screening and Selection:
An Ethical Analysis, 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 586, 586 (2003).
162. Id.
163. In April 2003, a three judge panel, composed of senior justices of the United
Kingdom's Court of Appeal overturned a ban proscribing parents from reproducing to
aid a dying child. "Designer Baby" Ban Quashed: A Ban on a Couple Creating a Baby
to Help Save Their Child Has Been Overturned by the Court of Appeal, BBC NEWS,
Apr. 8, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1lhilhealthl2928655.stm.
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pregnancies and preterm illegal drug use, the right to parent is
closely guarded and protected. 164
Here, I briefly consider what I believe is the genesis of judi
cially enforced duties to rescue others. In my opinion, were the
plaintiff in the first reported case of this kind a competent person,
rather than a mentally incompetent adult, our case law would look
very different. Our endorsement of eugenics contributed to the
precedent that courts follow. Eugenics evolved rapidly from a race
based hegemonic ideal to one that enveloped class, mental acuity,
and a host of social behaviors.1 65 Its all-consuming philosophy,
however, legitimized practices that we quickly abandoned post
World War II, to distinguish ourselves from the enemy abroad. 166
Respected jurists, members of Congress, and presidents were
eugenicists. 167 To be sure, eugenics was not simply a philosophy,
but a way in which twentieth-century pragmatists believed they
could better organize the world, their country, communities, and
families.
In 1969, the Kentucky Court of Appeals became the first court
in the United States to address, in a reported decision, whether a
parent could authorize removal of one child's kidney-to surrender
it to another. 168 Ava Strunk petitioned the court for the removal of
one of her son Jerry Strunk's kidneys for implantation in his
brother, Tommy.169 Jerry Strunk, a twenty-seven-year-old mentally
incompetent person, with the capacity of a six-year-old, was con
fined to Frankfort State Hospital as a ward of the state. 170 His
brother, Tommy, twenty-eight-years-old, suffered from chronic glo
164. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60 (1976); see also Martin
Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589,
603-04 (2002) (arguing that the right to parent has been recognized as a fundamental
right by Supreme Court).
165. Paul A. Lombardo, "The American Breed": Nazi Eugenics and the Origins of
the Pioneer Fund, 65 ALB. L. REV. 743, 754-55 (2002).
166. [d.
167. [d. at 749-55; see EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK: EUGENICS AND
AMERICA's CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A MASTER RACE (2003).
168. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Ky. App. 1969). Three unreported
Massachusetts decisions addressed whether parental authority to consent to similar
medical procedures involving twins was permissible. These cases, however, were not
reported and thus were not readily accessible to judges and law clerks in other jurisdic
tions. See Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 (Cutter, Single Justice, Eq. Supr. Jud. Ct.
(Mass.) Nov. 20, 1957); Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666 (Whittemore, Single Justice, Eq.
Supr. Jud. Ct. (Mass.) Aug. 30, 1957); Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 (Counihan, Single
Justice, Eq. Supr. Jud. Ct. (Mass.) June 12, 1957).
169. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146.
170. [d. at 147.
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merulus nephritis, a kidney disease, which would have caused his
death without the transplant. l71
Owing its authority to the doctrine of substituted judgment,172
the court opined that principles laid out over the centuries in the
United States as well as abroad, were broad enough "not only to
cover property but also to cover all matters touching on the well
being of [Strunk]."173 With that authority, the court, in a split four
to-three decision, found it to be in the best interest of Jerry Strunk
to provide a kidney to his older brother, TomP4 The court rea
soned that Tom's life was more valuable to Jerry than his kidney,
suggesting that "emotionally and psychologically[,] ... his well-be
ing would be jeopardized more severely by the loss of his brother
than by the removal of a kidney."175 The majority found Jerry's
happiness to be linked to Tom's survival.1 76 And, although Jerry's
guardian ad litem strongly urged against the operation, the court
was not persuaded. 177
Strunk is a unique case to launch this jurisprudence because it
involves a distinct set of circumstances, at an interesting time in
American history. That Jerry was mentally incompetent, with an
1.0. of thirty-five, may have been more revealing and probative for
the court than the close bond between the brothers that the justices
allude to, but fail to substantiate with any clear evidence-after all
Jerry had been locked away in an asylum in another city. That Jerry
would be sad if his brother died is instinctual, a feeling that even
non-siblings would share, but it is not a persuasive claim for justify
ing disregarding a constitutional right to privacy and bodily
integrity.
Paul Lombardo forcefully describes how the eugenics move
ment gained popuiarityP8 He argues that state legislation, court
opinions, and social movements that followed must be placed in
context. The first to feel the brunt of the effort to build a fitter race
were incompetent persons. One of the most notorious rulings in
171. Id. at 145.
172. Substituted judgment arises from English case law, which permitted courts of
equity to intercede on behalf of employers suffering from "lunacy" to provide a pension
for retiring servants. See Ex parte Whitebread, (1816) 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch.); In re
Earl of Carysfort, (1840) 41 Eng. Rep. 418 (Ch.).
173. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 148.
174. Id. at 149.
175. [d. at 146.
176. Id.
177. [d. at 147.
178. See Lombardo, supra note 165.
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volving incompetent persons was Buck v. Bell, wherein Justice
Holmes opined "three generations of imbeciles is enough" to give
the state authority over their reproductive privacy, particularly the
fallopian tubes of women alleged to be mentally incompetent. 179
His notorious eugenics cry heralded an era in which tens of
thousands of men and women were sterilized in the United States
based on the notion that they harbored bad genes. 180
According to Justice Holmes and others jurists for some time
to come, the mentally disabled usurped significant State resources;
they were burdens to society that never reciprocated social or eco
nomic altruism. His reasoning in Buck v. Bell illuminates this point:
It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already

sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not
felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being
swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if in
stead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to
let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who
are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. 181

What we learn in Strunk, beyond the seminal precedent set by
the court, is that the mentally ill were compromised citizens and
perhaps more easily at the disposal of courts for less sensitive treat
ment. 182 During this period, the Constitution and common law had
what Pierre Schlag might call "plastic" value; legal protection corre
sponded to social status.1 83 Consider, for example, that Jerry is re
ferred to as "defective" throughout the amicus brief submitted by
the Kentucky Department of Mental Health, which supported the
removal of his kidney. Tom had a social value recognized not only
by the court but also by society; the two brothers, however, were
not social or legal equals. Building toward its holding, the court
179. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) ("The principle that sustains com
pulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.").
180. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, RE
PRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997); Lombardo, supra note 165 (doc
umenting the early economic, political, and social ties to eugenics in the United States).
181. Buck, 274 U.S. at 201.
182. Shortly after Strunk, two cases with similar facts were brought in sister juris
dictions, one in Wisconsin and the other, Louisiana. Those courts departed from
Strunk, holding that it would not be in the best interest of mentally disabled siblings to
have parents or courts substitute their consent for non-therapeutic surgeries to procure
their organs for the benefit of a sibling. See In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226
N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
183. Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801,
848-49 (1991).
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pointedly observed that Tom was married, working, and going to
college, and that undoubtedly he would benefit society.184
My point, however, is that the ruling in Strunk was a slippery
slope; the case was not limited to "mentally deficient persons," but
rather to persons who were incompetent to make those complicated
transplant decisions independently, especially minors. Viewed in
this way, the ruling expanded judicial authority to impose its judg
ment in transplant cases; that judgment happened to consistently
coincide with and affirm parental appeals. In failing to predict the
robust technological developments that would facilitate better diag
nosis of diseases and make organ transplantation more accessible,
the court was somewhat shortsighted. 185 Within a few years of
Strunk, jurisdictions in Virginia,186 Texas,187 and Connecticut I88
adopted its expanding jurisprudence. The Little v. Little I89 case
permitted a mother (one week after declaring her daughter incom
petent) to order her daughter's kidney removed so that the organ
could be provided to the girl's brother. The court concluded that
the fourteen-year-old, although declared incompetent, could never
theless benefit psychologically from surrendering her organ to a
sibling. 190
Subsequent jurisprudence expanded the Strunk ruling to in
clude living donors who are minors.1 91 In Hart v. Brown,l92 Con
necticut parents of seven-year-old twins sought a declaratory
judgment to permit the removal of one daughter's kidney for im
184. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 145 (Ky. App. 1969).
185. See Emily Denham Morris, Note, The Organ Trail: Express Versus Presumed
Consent as Paths to Blaze in Solving a Critical Shortage, 90 Ky. L.J. 1125, 1149 (2001)
(asserting that "[o]ne problem with most of the regulations passed and common law
rules set out by courts regarding organ and tissue donation has been short-sightedness
when dealing with future technological advances. Courts do not have crystal balls that
can predict the future" of technological advancements.).
186. See Hurdle v. Currier, 5 Va. Cir. 509, 513 (1977) (opining that under the
circumstances parents possessed the legal authority to require minor daughter to sur
render her kidney to her sibling).
187. See Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (opining that
the mother had the legal authority to substitute judgment for her fourteen-year-old
daughter for purposes of consenting to a kidney "donation").
188. See Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 391 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (holding that
parents have the authority to require seven-year-old daughter to surrender her organ
for donation to her twin sibling).
189. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493.
190. /d. at 500.
191. See id. (holding that nothing in Texas law forbade the court granting author
ity to a mother to have her daughter's kidney removed to aid her brother).
192. Hart, 289 A.2d 386.
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plantation in her sister. The donee's physician refused to perform
the operations and the hospital was unwilling to permit the use of
its facilities unless the court declared the parents able to consent on
behalf of Kathleen Hart, their daughter, to organ removal for pro
curement to her sister.1 93 For the physicians, clear ethical problems
existed; to whom would they owe a duty of loyalty? As for liability,
could Kathleen later sue under battery theory, having been sub
jected to an unwanted medical procedure without her consent, or
conversion for the extraction of the organ and its use by a third
party?194
The Connecticut Superior Court found that Kathleen's partici
pation in the organ donation process would be "most beneficial" to
her.1 95 The court reasoned that Kathleen would be happy if her
family were happy.196 Strunk's instructive posture proved helpful
for the Hart court as it too reached beyond the original intent of
substituted judgment theory by expanding its scope to children. 197
Is "immense benefit" the appropriate standard of review? The lon
gevity of happiness in a child or a family is difficult to predict. Fam
ilies separate, divorce, and may be later reconstituted with different
people. Placing responsibility on a child to promote that type of
happiness through uninformed, nonconsensual, and invasive sur
geries stretches the boundaries of pragmatic decision-making. It
may be the case that circumstances present an opportunity for fam
ily members, particularly children, to help in extraordinary ways,
but the courts' analyses in these cases have yet to establish the prag
matic limitations and reconcile those with moral principles and pre
existing legal rules. 198
After Strunk and its progeny, a few conclusions can be drawn.
Notwithstanding Curran, the first and most obvious conclusion is
that children do not possess the "right to refuse" an organ or tissue
harvest. Second, even if children had a recognized interest to refuse
organ harvesting or surrendering, that interest is subordinate to the
right of parents to substitute their judgment. Third, whether evok
ing the rhetoric of best interest or relying on substituted judgment,
193. Id. at 387.
194. Cf Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (opining that a
doctor must obtain consent before performing surgery on a minor in a case where mi
nor's skin was removed on two occasions for grafting onto his cousin).
195. Hart, 289 A.2d at 389.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 387-88.
198. See Morley, supra note 88, at 1240-43 (arguing that guilt often influences
organ donation decisions).
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courts are reluctant to interfere with parental authority and deci
sion-making, thereby effectively reducing, or altogether eliminat
ing, the function of the courts in grappling with these complex
issues. The outcomes in these instances will be obvious and the
proceedings pro forma; unless there is conflict between the parents,
they will always win. Fourth, the Strunk progeny demonstrates the
plasticity of the law as related to minors (and incompetent persons).
Courts have ostensibly created an exception to the rescue doctrine
for children. The legislative and judicial failure to recognize the
contradictions is manifold.
CONCLUSION

My Sister's Keeper is a daring book, illuminating the very real
struggle within families when one child is sick and biotechnology
offers a solution at a very steep price. Picoult provides an illumi
nating case study; my effort here was to explain what that case
study means in the context of American jurisprudence. Biotechnol
ogy transports us to types of medical research unforeseeable and
uncharted thirty years ago. The human genome was yet to be
mapped, and bio-prospecting had relevance only for plants and
wildlife, not human beings as we see now. Technology was less so
phisticated and its robust economic potential was yet to be fully
appreciated. From this perspective, Curran, Strunk, Little, and
Hart were possibly short-term solutions to problems on a much
grander scale. With parental immunity challenges on the horizon in
some jurisdictions, the possibility of warding off subsequent privacy
and tort lawsuits from children harmed psychologically or physi
cally by nonconsensual organ, tissue, or cell removal may be less
guaranteed. Picoult offers one way out for her protagonist: sue for
medical emancipation. Yet, Picoult is a tragic realist; hours after
winning her medical freedom, Anna is killed in an automobile acci
dent. In the end, she was her sister's keeper.
When altruism is the exclusive legal forum for organ and tissue
procurement, demand creates pressure within the limited pool,
causing tissue and organ solicitation to spread into black markets
and seep into less desirable altruistic subsystems.1 99 Parents, pa
tients, relatives, and friends confront burdened choices. The legal
alternatives are limited when altruism is the only legally permissible
199. See John Lawrence Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 631, 645 (1994)
(suggesting that the most controversial alternatives in organ transplantation would be
to create markets wherein living donations are solicited).
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form of organ and tissue procurement. The jurisprudence involving
compelled donations from siblings of children2°O dying from termi
nal illnesses presages future dynamics where the biological lines of
family may be less determinative, and therefore more fluid. 201 The
"existing, close relationship" standard adopted in Curran informs
us less about biology and more about personality, compatibility,
and friendship. The biology of family may be replaced by "family
relationship," which would seem logical given the sometimes legally
and socially arbitrary or ambiguous nature and definition of fam
ily.202 Blended households, step-siblings, adopted siblings, siblings
born of ova or sperm transactions, surrogate siblings, negotiated
siblings (children of same sex parents, born with the aid of an in
volved friend), and foster siblings all represent adaptations on the
traditional nuclear family "child" model.203
Indeed, the social contract functions only when mutual bar
gaining power and beneficial reciprocity exist. The benefits need
not be equal, but should be of some tangible value to both parties.
It also seems important that individuals be allowed to express their
generosity and humanity in ways that at times may burden their
liberties, including bodily integrity and privacy in the aid of an
other. Therefore, it would be unwise to prophylactically proscribe
individuals from participating in living donation, even some chil
dren. There must, however, be a balance beyond the tests previ
ously established.
First, it must be clearly understood that compelled living dona
tions from children and incompetent persons are the least desired
forms of donation. Donations from persons legally incompetent
cannot easily fit under the umbrella of altruism; the heightened
probability for compromising their humanity and dignity makes it
so. We must consider alternatives for desperate parents and sib
200. See Cheyette, supra note 143, at 469 (cautioning the use of incompetent per
sons as organ donors, declaring "[o]rgan harvests from children and mentally disabled
adults should be categorically prohibited. . .. [U]sing the most vulnerable members of
society to shield us from the pain of a loved one's illness or imminent death is unfair.").
201. Id. at 505-06.
202. Note, Looking for a Family Resemblence: The Limits of the Functional Ap
proach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991) (offering a
different legal view of what family means in the United States, calling it a rapidly chang
ing "anachronism").
203. See Larry V. Starcher, Supreme Court Page: The Family of 2003, W. VA.
LAW., Nov. 2003, at 8 ("[W]e have now moved into the twenty-first century, and the
percentage of American children living in 'traditional' married nuclear families is well
below a majority.... Single parents are raising 30% of our nation's children. In some
urban areas, 30 to 60% of children are being raised by neither biological parent.").
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lings beyond the reach of the most vulnerable members of their
families. Currently, federally mandated altruism procurement con
strains their ability to seek alternative, viable sources domestically.
Again, the weaker, less desirable options become the exclusive op
tions, quite unnecessarily. Conversely, those suspicious of the
American transplantation system lack the confidence and motiva
tion to participate in the current altruistic regime as donors, but it is
possible other systems might prove more attractive to them. Let us
remember children and the mentally ill are not viable replacements
for an incompetent, ineffective organ procurement system. Their
participation should be limited to the narrowest possibilities.
Second, minors younger than thirteen years old should be pro
scribed from participating in living donation procedures. An age
barrier would be no different than those imposed in labor or em
ployment systems. Children under thirteen lack the capacity to
substantially appreciate the nuances of these transactions, including
potential future health risks. This may also be true for teenagers;
however, it is more likely that teenagers will be more literate,
knowledgeable, educable, and aware than seven-year-olds. Their
understanding of the transplantation process will be more substan
tive than symbolic, resulting in meaningful dialogues about risks
and benefits of tissue and organ harvesting. Age should not be the
only criteria, lest it become an arbitrary element.
Third, a guardian ad litem should always be appointed. Fourth,
family and independent counseling must be required to ensure that
parents understand the dynamics and depth of their actions and
long term consequences. Fifth, an independent physician must be
appointed for the prospective donor to avoid conflicts of interest.
Finally, a statement should be issued to the court from the donor as
to why she desires to participate as an organ or tissue donor. Limit
ing the participation of children will reduce the pool of viable or
gans, and other solutions must be sought. However, limiting the
pool of child donors will necessitate and hopefully force a reconsid
eration of the altruistically based procurement regime.

